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INTRODUCTION 
Clarence Irving Lewis has presented a system of ethical principles 
which he has asserted to be the proper guide for all human activity. 
This system is purported to be a cognitive one; that is, it is one the 
principles of which may be known in terms of meaningful, verifiable appre-
hensions. The justification of this system is thus based upon Lewis' 
epistemology. 
According to Lewis, knowledge is composed of correct cognitions. 
Cognitions may be either analytic or empirical according to the nature of 
the verification involved. The basic assumption which Lewis makes, and 
which he takes care to point out, is that all men, in facing the facts of 
life, acknowledge the existence of an objective reality--a reality ex-
ternal to the self. It is this reality, as it is known, which provides 
the ultin'.!-ate standard for judging the correctness of any judgment which 
is capable of affecting human life. 
Since the justification of Lewis' system of ethics is based upon 
his epistemology, this basis must be discussed. As knowledge results 
from cognitions and is composed of correct cognitions, the elements of 
cognition will be discussed with emphasis placed upon those points which 
are deemed to be essential to Lewis' justification. The two types of 
cognition distinguished by Lewis (the analytically verifiable and the 
empirically verifiable) contain a judgment which is of something not 
immediately apprehended but is based upon what is so apprehended. It 
1 
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is the judgment which is to be verified. 
Apprehension must .therefore be discussed. Three types of appre-
hension will be pointed out: 1) apprehension of immediately given sense 
data only 2) analytical apprehension and 3) empirical apprehension. Of 
these three types only the latter two are found to be cognitive· i.e., to 
possess the potentiality of becoming knowledge. However, it will be noted 
that apprehensions of the first .type are necessary components of empirical 
apprehensions. 
Analytic apprehensions, according to Lewis, deal with meanings and 
meaning-relations which may result in analytic knowledge. All knowledge 
and.all cognitions which are analytic are also~ priori, and the converse 
also holds: all that is~ priori is analytic. There is simply no know-
· ledge which may be clas.sified as synthetic ~ priori. Since ~ priori 
knowledge is knowledge of meanings and meaning-relations, the four types 
distinguished by Lewis will be discussed. These types of meaning are 
extension, comprehension, intension, and signification. The discussion 
of the types of meaning·. is presented in an effort to answer two questions 
which are relevant to~ priori knowledge and analytically verifiable 
apprehensions-in general: 1) What is meant by meaning? and 2) What, pre-
cisely, is the connection between meaning and knowledge? 
A discussion of analytically verifiable apprehensions, .the nature 
and types of meaning, and!!. priori knowledge is deemed necessary·to pro-
vide an adequate explanation of Lewis' justification of ethical knowledge, 
because this.justification depends upon his claim that the proposed 
system of ethical principles is consistent and that the principles them-
II • ·II t selves are obJects of pragmatically,.§. priori knpwledge. In just wha 
manner these princ~ples are!!. priori is to be ascertained; thus, the 
3 
discussion of meaning and meaning-relations must be undertaken. However, 
the pragmatic element must also be considered since the principles 
require empirical justification of i:;heir usefulness as principles of- the 
morally right. The consideration of the pragmatic element requires that 
-attention be focused upon the nature of empirically verifiable apprehensions. 
While the judgment contained in-an analytic cognition is of meaning-
relations, the judgment which an empirical cognition contains concerns 
matters of objective fact and is based, at least partially, upon immedi-
.ately given sense data. An adequate discussion of empirical knowledge 
must inclu.de what is given in experience, the part played py the 11mind 11 
in an empirical cognition, the types of empirical judgment, . and the methods 
of justification and verification of empirical judgments. Empirical justi-
fication is a major point of concern.here since any judgment of the moral 
rightness of an act is to be so justified. 
Lewis' justification of his ethical system has, as. its_ aim, the 
determination.of the consistency of the.§. priori nature of the ethical 
principles with the analytic and .§. priori .in .general. The empirical impli-
cations and determinants of these principles must .also be explained in.a 
satisfactory manner. The justification, in other words, must show·that 
·the combination of ethical rationalism with ethical naturalism .is con-
sistent with Lewis' epistemology. 
The ethi,cal principles are..§. priori in that they1are definitive of 
_right~ and analytically derived statements of the principles are,.§. 
priori in that they are true by definition. The rightness-of an act is 
determined by the consequences of that act, and rightness is therefore 
I 
determined by means of an empirical justification. Furthermore, the 
empirical element of the ethical system also includes the acknowledgment 
of the fact of the social aspect of human life. Lewis makes the combi-
nation of the empirical with the analytic elements by means of his con-
ception df the pragma:tically ~ priori. Thus, a discussion of the prag-
matically~ :priori will be needed.in conjunction with the discussion of 
Lewis' justification. And, both.of these discussions rely in a large 
measure upon a detailed description of the analytical and empirical 
elements of knowledge. 
Cognitions result in knowledge if the cognitive judgments which 
they contain are correct. In other words, a meaningful apprehension is 
considered to be knowledge if the criteria of knowledge are met by the 
apprehension. So,. the criteria of knowledge will. be enwner.ated. This 
enumeration is also necessary in order to explain the manner in which 
4 
the principles of the morally right may be known. The principles of the 
morally right form a cognitive system, and apprehension of the moral prin-
ciples stands in need of justification as much as any other apprehension. 
Thus, a morally evaluative cognition will be either correct or incorrect. 
The question of whether any cognition is correct or·incorreht .is 
essentially the question of whether the cognitive judgment is right or 
wrong. The moral sense of right and wrong, however, cannot immediately 
•be identified with right and wrong in general. A discussi.on of the 
justification of moral judgments requires a preliminary. discussion of 
general value theory if for no other reason than to clarify terminology. 
Another equally, if not more,.important reason for including a discussion 
of general value theory is (to show) in just what the justification of an 
evaluative judgment (of which moral judgments are a type) consists. 
The justification of ethical principles also includes consideration 
Of results of particular acts undertaken in view of the ethical principles, 
5 
Acts nmst therefore be distinguished from behavior in general, and also 
from .. action in general. This distinction also serves to illustrate the 
conne.ction of episterriology, act, evaluation, and ethics. Since moral 
judgments are justified by results of particular acts based upon them, 
there must be some result which serves as a criterion of justificatiop. 
At this point, a discussion of value, valuation, and comparative value 
will be presented. Values which are objective are distinguished from 
subje.ctive values. It is held by Lewis that good and bad are objective 
values and are thus attributable to objects .and events. The morally 
right, however, is attributable to acts and to the doers of the acts. 
Whether an act and the doer of. it are morally right, and whether the 
result of the act possesses comparative good, are all matters of fact; 
d tt f f t th " b . t " f . t . d an, .as ma ers o ac, ey are proper· O·Jec s o cogni ion an can 
be known in one of. the manners discussed in connection with Lewis' 
epistemology. 
Lewis' justification seeks to establish that the moral principles 
.are~ priori and are imperatives of the morally right; yet, at the same 
time, it must account for the empirical element. in our knowledge o.f the 
moral principles. This is attempted by making the distinction between 
the moral principles and the grounds of the moral principles. The 
grounds of the moral principles are simplyacknowledged and remain un-
changed. The moral principles are amenable to alteration or may. be 
abandoned in the face of empirical situations which are new or changing 
and which repeatedly do not justify the moral principles as being the 
correct guides to right acts. The moral principles are the result.of 
. interpretations .of tki.-e concept of the basic moral imperative. His 
argument for·the pragmatically~ priori nature of the moral principles 
6 
comes.in .for a large amount of criticism. Much of this criticism consists 
of the complaint that Lewis doesn't develop his concepts of good and jus-
tice. This. is, however, more of a complaint than a valid criticism even 
though it is perhaps a well-founded complaint. Lewis makes some mention 
of what the good is not, but he does not.attempt to explain his concept 
of good nor does he pursue·any discussion of the nature of justice. There 
are, on the other hand, two criticisms of Lewis' justification which are 
serious, well-taken, and to which an adequate justification must provide 
answers. The objection raised by William K. Frankena is representative 
of the criticism of the cognitive nature of Lewis' system. The objection 
raised by Hans Reichenbach is representative of the criticism of Lewis' 
assertions to the effect that there must be.§. priori principles as a 
guide to morally right acting. Both of these types of objection will be 
outlined and set against Lewis' justification. 
A detailed exposition of Lewis' justification of his system of 
ethical principles will show that there are indeed some shortcomings in 
.the justification. These shortcomings include those points which are 
attacked by. the two types of objection mentioned above. Lewis' justi-
fication cannot stand in the face of these objections. However, in~ 
Social Inheritance, Lewis seemed to be aware of these difficulties and 
began to rework his justification. This alteration, though, was never 
completed and stands in need of clarification and further development. 
The more recent justification, it is suggested, can be developed in such 
a manner as to answer the mentioned objections and, at the same time, 
remain consistent with his epistemology and with his system of ethics. 
It is this suggestion which is the thesis of this entire presentation. 
CHAPTER I 
THE ELEMENTS OF KNOWLEDGE 
Expeirience, Knowledge, and Reality 
In an exposition of a theory of knowledge, the assumptions underlying 
the particular theory are the first items of concern. Perhaps the most 
fundamental assumption which has been made by Lewis is that of an inde-
pendent reality. Lewis considers the existence of an independent reality 
to be so evident that he categorically asserts that everyone acknowledges 
·t 1 l • . From this, it follows that there is some relationship between an 
individual as the knower and what is external to the individual as. the 
known. There must be some means by which independent reality, at least 
in part, becomes known by the individual, or, in other words, there must 
be some manner in which the individual becomes aware of the existence of 
something external.to himself .. As a first approximation, it might be 
said that a person experiences independent reality. 
Experience, however, is not a precise term. It can be used to 
refer either to a passive or to an active mental state; but, when Lewis 
writes of cognitive experience, it is evident that he is using the term 
1"Independent reality ~snot seimething to be proved but an original 
acknowledgment which all men make confronting the facts of life." C, I, 
· Lewis, "Realism or Phenomen.alism?" Philosophical Review (LXIV, 2: 1955) , 
p. 238. . 
7 
·"experience" with reference to an.active mental state.2 Furthermore, 
only an active. being·• is held to be capable of knowing. 3 
To this p.oint, it appear~ that an active being may experience a 
reality external to that being, What is to be considered next is the 
8 
subject-object relation involved in experience and how this relation may 
res.ult .in knowle.dge. Knowledge results from .cognition, although not all 
cognitions res.ult in knowledge. Cognitions which result in knowledge are 
those which meet the criteria of knowledge . 
. Lewis, . in An ,Analysis .Qf Knowledge and Valuation, suggests four 
criteria of ·knowledge: 
11 (1) Knowledge must be apprehension of or belief in what 
is true or·is fact, as against what is false or·is not fact .. 
11 (2) Cognition generally, or the content of it, must have 
meaning· in. the sense that something is signified, believed·· in, 
or asserted which•lies beyond or outside of the cognitive ex-
.perience itself. . . 
"G) Knowledge must have a ground or reason ... [and] 
holding of belief in the absence of any warrant or justifying 
consideration,is not to be classed as knowledge even when it 
happens to accord with the facts ... 
11 (4) Knowledge, or at least knouledge in the best and 
quite strict sense, must be certain." 
Immediately following this enumeration of the criteria of knowledge, 
Lewis takes care to point out that it would be very difficult so to de-
fine knowledge as to insist .upon the simultaneous application of all 
four criteria. 
In any given situation, one criterion might be applicable when 
2"First, it is requisite to point out that knowing be an.assertive 
state of mind," C, I. Lewis, .£n .. Analysis of Knowledge ·.fil1£ Valuation 
(Open Court, 1962), p. 9, In subsequent references Analysis .Qf ~-
.ledge~ Valuation will be abbreviated A.K. V. 
3cf. A.K.V., p. 17, 
4 A.K.V, p. 27, 
9 
another criterion would not. However, each of these criteria reflect 
the consideration that knowledge has an.apposit: the possibility of 
error. There is thus. another consideration necessary.in proper appli-
cation of the criteria: 
"In these conventions, the ruling consideration in each 
case, is the contrast of knowledge with some corresponding 
kind of possible error. 115 
It seems, then, that a description of knowledge might very well begin 
with a discussion of meaning and of apprehension; for, meaning and appre-
hension are held to be the "fundamental cognitive phenomena. 116 
Meaning and Apprehension 
Modes of Meaning. Traditionally, meaning has been characterized as 
having two modes: the extensional (denotative) mode and the intensional 
(connotative) mode. Lewis has designated two additional modes of mean-
ing: comprehension and signification. 7 
The denotation, or extension, of a term is that class of things to 
which the term is correctly applied. The extension of a term is limited 
to actually existing things; so, if a term names a null class, the term 
is said to have zero extension. Even though a term may have zero ex-
tension, it may still have a denotative potentiality. And, it is just 
such potentiality which distinguishes terms with zero extension from 
5 A.K. V,, p. 30, 
6 Cf. A,K,V., p. 37, 
?Meaning is predicated of terms, and Lewis defines a.term as 
II 
.an expression capable of naming or applying to a thing or things, 
of some kind. 11 A.K.V., p. 39, Cf. A.K.v., pp. 38-41. 
10 
h t L • 11 II 1 t • 1!8 w a· ewis ca s nonsense- ocu ions. 
All those things to which a term might be applied correctly comprise 
the II • II comprehension of that term. Thus, the extension of a term is in-
eluded in its comprehension; the converse, however, does not hold. 
The essence of a thing correctly named bya term consists of those 
attributes of the thing named which are necessary for the proper appli-
cation of that term. The total essential character of a thing nameable 
bya term is the "signification" of that term. 9 
Intension (or connotation) simply refers to the intention in the 
use of a term. Intensional meaning is that mode of meaning which 
" ... expresses in that simplest and most frequent sense 
[that] which is the original meaning of meaning; that sense 
in which what we mean by 'A' is what we have in mind in 
using 'A', and what is oftentimes spoken of as the concept 
of A. "10 
The intension of a term may be. interpreted either as sense meaning or 
as· linguistic meaning, so it is ne_cessary to distinguish these two in-
terpretatieins. 
If a consistent logical system is taken as an example, it can be 
seeh that every proposition within the system has meaning only·in 
relation to the other propositions contained in the system. There.is 
no criterion of meaning applicable to these propositions which is ex-
ternal to the system itself. In terms of this analogy, the criteria of 
meaning for words, phrases, and statements would be solely in terms of 
other words, phrases, and statements. However, such.a system.in and of 
8 A, K. V, , p. 40. 
911 . . 
Abstract terms are those which name what some other term signi:-
. II 4 fies. , . Non-,abstract terms are concrete.· A.K,V,, p, .1. 
10 
. A,K,V., p. 43. 
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itself cannot determine analytic truth except, .in a twisted sense, that 
which is set up by convention. It is this interpretation of intensional 
meaning which .is referred to as linguistic meaning. Linguistic meaning 
deals only with structural relationships of meanings and is .thus inde-
pendent of empirical fact (which is one criterion of analytic truth) . 
But, the explanation of its independence shows that it is achieved by 
virtue of removing from.such analytic statements 
" .any character of truth; or at least by abstracting 
from any character of analytic statements fthat] by virtue of 
which they could be either true or false. 1111 
There is, in linguistic meaning, no significance found in analytic 
truth beyond that of such linguistic conventions as syntax.and defi-
.nitions. Lewis thus makes the assertion that 
" .the conventions of language determine no analytic truth 
but only how it may be expressed. They are a .factor·in the 
analytic truth of statements only because correct expression 
of a relation which holds is essential to the truth of state-
ments. "12 · 
If expressions have meaning only.in relation to other expressions, 
then all use of language would. amount to nothing more than .an abstract 
deductive logical system in which meanings could be determined only by 
.· conventional relationships. 
The other aspect of intensional meaning is known as sense meaning. 
Sense meaning is that interpretation of the intensional meaning of an 
expression which refers to the signification of the expression. The 
relations of sense meanings.serve as criteria for the application of 
expressions. • II . II For example, the sense meaning of· dog will include 
ll 
· A,K,V., .p. 147. 
12 A.K.V., p. 156. 
12 
"canine" and exclude "feline. 11 Sense meaning is not denotation. The 
denotation of an expression is dependent upon the existence of what is 
meant; there is no such dependence in the case of sense meaning, As an 
.aspect of intension, sense me·aning is "in the mind. 11 Thus, Lewis holds 
sense meaning to indicate" .. ,intension as a.criterion in mind."13 
It is the sense meaning of an expression which enables one to deter-
mine whether to apply·that expression to any given situation ("real" or 
) II II • tt 
.·imaginary correctly. In a purely analytic sense, it. is evident ha 
for there to be any sense meaning, there must be a capacity for. im.agi-
nation. ,· II Imagination, prior to any experience, provides .... a workable 
criterion for applying or refusing to apply.an expression under·all 
. 1114 
circumstances of presentation. 
Sense meaning.is not, however, simply that meaning which•is con-
tained .. in . imagery. It is also a schema. . The sense meaning of a term 
indicates a procedure and a procedural result which serve as criteria of 
applicability for the term. And, while the applicability of a term,is 
··• 
determined byits sense meaning, the sense meaning of a statement 
(couched in "sense presentable characters") determines the truth .or 
15 falsity of that. statement. The relationships of sense meanings are not 
subject to arbitrary,,linguistic conventions. Analytically true state-
ments are, of course, true independently of any given empirical situation. 
Another requirement is imposed: that there be no theoretical limit 
13 
· A.K.V., p. 133, 
14 
.. A.K.V., p. 134. 
15That. "sense presentable characters" may have been provided.by the 
·imagination is.irrelevant to the determination of analytic truth, because 
there is no denotation involved. 
13 
i mposed upon the possible confirmation of such a statement. 
It is intention in the form of sense meaning which makes analytic 
truth independent of any arbitrary conventions of language. Linguistic 
meaning serves only to determine the~ of expression of analytic truth; 
i t is a necessary part of analytic truth because the truth of statements 
i ncludes correct expression. The fundamental consideration for analytic 
truth is thus" ... the relations of testable and sense-recognizable 
characters which are our criteria of classification and of the application 
. 1116 
of verbal expressions. 
Concepts. The mode of expression, or structure of an analytic state-
ment is called a concept. Since "The notion of a concept as such is its 
internal (essential or definitive) relationships with other concepts,"17 
conceptualization is thus an analytic process, the results of which may 
be determined as correct or incorrect. Since the concept is a defin1tive 
structure of relationships of meanings, the criterion of consistency is 
to be applied as a test for the correctness of any conceptual relation. 
Concepts represent those definitive classifications brought by mental pro-
cesses to an apprehension (whether the apprehension is analytic or em-
pirical) which render the apprehension cognitive. 
Ty:pes of apprehension. There are, according to Lewis, three dis-
tinct types of apprehension: 1) apprehension of immediately given sense 
data only; 2) those apprehensions which are empirically verifiable; and 
18 
3) those apprehensions which are analytically verifiable or confirmable. 
16 A.K.V., p. 156. 
17 
C. I. Lewis,~~ the World Order (Dover, 1956), p. 83. In 
subsequent references, Mi.ul1 !illli. ~ World Order will be abbreviated M.W.O. 
18 
A.K.V., p. 30, 
l4 
Apprehensions of the second and third types are meaningful, while those 
of the first type are not. The suggestion :made here. is that only me.aning-
-~ apprehensions may properly be called cognitive. 
The first. type of apprehension--that of immediately given sense data 
only--cannot, in and of itself, be considered.as cognitive. In the first 
place, thi,s type of apprehension implies a strictly passive mental state, 
while the cognitive mental state is an active one. Of the fundamental 
cognitive criteria, that of meaning is absent in ~uch an apprehension . 
. Immediately given sense data do not categorize themselves. Consequently, 
apprehensions of this type simply result-in some sort of' 11feeling;" for, 
it is the.missing analytical element, the concept, which providesthe 
meanings that are necessary,for any determination of correctness. 
Secondly, .such.apprehensions could not result.in knowledge because they 
·are immediate and complete in and of themselves and thus admit of no 
possibility of error. The lack of the possibility of error prevents this 
type of apprehension,frombeing cognitive. Finally, even though such 
apprehensions are certain, .they do not involve any ground.or reason-for 
holding a belief nor do they make an assertion about anything beyond or 
external to the experience itse.lf. Apprehensions of immediate sense data 
only are not cognitive and cannot, by themselves, result in knowledge. 
While apprehensions of immediate sense data only are not in and of 
themselves cognitive, such apprehensions are definitely. a part of cogni·-
tive experience. If the element of mental activity-is added to sense 
apprehension,.the second type of apprehension--empirically verifiable 
apprehension--results. According to Lewis, 11The content of cognition 
. b l . f Wh t . b l " d . b . t . t t f ff . ' rrl9 is e 1e ... a is so ·e 1eve. is some O·Jec 1ve s a e o a airs. 
19Le · "R l" Ph 1· ?" . ·t 236 wis, ea ism or enomena ism. op c1 ., p. . 
15 
This·no.tion of cognition is further explained .in the second criterion of 
. knowledge. by asserting that cognitions must have meaning in terms of some-
thing lying :beyond:" or external to the cognitive experience ·itself; 20 An 
empirically·verifiable cognition asserts a proposition about an as yet to 
be experienced empirical situation on the basis of a now present appre-
hension. Such ·an .assertion ds made possible by the proper application of 
conc~pts to the given sense data .. Knowledge based upon empirically·veri-
fiable apprehensions (empirical cognitions) depends upon·verification of 
the cognitive assertion ,for.· its assurance of truth. 
Actual verification,is .!!2i,.however, a criterion of meaning. Em-
.. Pirical meaning .~ .. involve conceivable verifiability. An empirical 
_cognition might very well be meaningful; yet, due to practical or theor-
etical difficulties, .it might not result.in knowledge because of the 
. lack, of verification. An apprehension, of this type might assert that 
there is some form.of·life present on the planet Saturn. While-this 
assertion has-not been verif'ied, it is still a meaningful assertion. 
· The primary requirement for empirical verifiability, according to Lewis, 
is 
II 
.. ,that we should be able to analyze the supposed connection 
between t.he projected verifying experience and what is . actually 
given ... in such wise that this procedure of verification can 
be envisaged in analogy with operations·that can actually.be 
carried out. 1121 
In short, empirically-verifiable apprehensions are those which maybe 
expressed by. terms having denotative potentiality. 
Apprehensions of the third type--those which.are analytically 
20 
· .. A,K, V., p. 27, 
21 · · 
. C I L ' 11E ' d Me ' 11 Ph'l h' 1 R . . . . ew1.s, xper1.ence · an an1.ng. . J. osop . ica . ev1.ew 
(XLIII, 2; ,, 1934),. p. 139, 
• f • bl 1 • t • Wh t • II • II • th • th veri ia· e- .. are a so cogni ive. .. a is given in· is case are . e 
definitive relations of sense meanings of a statement or expression,.and 
the assertions made on the basis of the given meaning-relations:are about 
further Telations implici,t inLthose which are given. These apprehensions 
. are cognitive--possessed of the potentiality for knowle.dge- .. as was pointed 
out above, because there is the possibility of error in the process of 
inferring the implicit relations from those which .are given. If such 
,inferences are consistent, then·the relations are·verified as certain; 
hence,.the truth•claim of the assertion.is validated, and knowledge has 
resulted from an analytically verifiable apprehension. 
There are thus two types of apprehension which are cognitive. If 
cognitions may result. in knowledge and if cognitions .are meaningful 
apprehensions, then, since the meanings of one type of cognition.are 
-connotative and those of the other type are denotative, it follows that 
there are • two ·types.· of ·knowledge: analytic · knowledge . and empirical know-
.ledge, respectively. 
CHAPTER II 
THE 'IWO TYPES OF KNOWLEDGE 
Since· knowledge is correct cognition, the determination.of the 
truth-claims of cognitions is a necessary condition of knowledge . 
. Th.is .involves the notion of verifiability. As was noted above,. those 
apprehensions which are cognitive are verifiable, but some ~ognitions. 
-are analytically verifiable while others are empirically verifiable, 
The two types of verifiability give rise to the two types of knowledge. 
Analytic Knowledge 
Analytic·kno:wledge is the type of knowledge which results from 
the v:erification of analytically·verifiable apprehensions, Verifi,-
,cation is taken here to be the certification of the truth-claim of a 
cognition. In the case of cognitions which are analytically verifiable, 
such certifications will.involve the relationships of meanings. 
Coincidence of the l! priori and the. analytic .. A preliminary point 
. • 111 to be made is that 11 • • • the .§. ,priori and the analytic coincide. 
,.All analytic knowledge is l! priori in that 1) it is completely independent 
of empiricaLmatter.s of fact, and 2) it. is neces.sary. Lewis. also con-
2 
tends· that .all l! ~priori knowledge is· also analytic knowledge. (For 
1 A.K,V., p. 35, 
2 
· Cf, A.K.V., p. 35, 
17 
18 
t.he purpose of the present description of analytic knowledge, "analytic 
kn 1 d " d " ' . kn 1 d " ·11 b . d. 1 ) owe ge an .§. priori owe ge wi ·e use synonymous y. 
The characteristics of.§. ,:eriori truths should suffice to describe 
~ priori knowledge, since it is composed entirely of such truths. ·The 
manner in which.§. priori truths are discovered is also the manner in 
which the verification of. the analytically verifiable apprehensions is 
accomplished. Lewis asserts that there are three factors in determining 
~· priori truths: . 1) linguistic expression; . 2) methods of choosing our 
classificatory procedures; and 3) relationships of sense meanings. 3 
The conditions of necessity and independence from any and all em-
pirical situations must be met if a statement is to be analytically 
verified. If the statement, "All men.are mortals," is considered, the 
~ priori truth of that statement is apprehended only.by.knowing that 
all men are necessarily mortals. It is the nature of such necessity 
4 
and how it .can be known which constitutes the epistemological problem. 
Analytically true·statements are ,lli21 necessary in the sense of forcing 
themselves upon the mind. Rather, they are logically necessary.5 
There are two types of analytic statement: those which are implicit 
and t.hose which. are explicit. An explicit . analytic statement asserts 
the logical necessity of something. An implicit analytic statement 
asserts something which is logically necessary but does not assert 
6 " " . that it. is logically necessary. . All men are mortals, · is implicitly 
3cf. A 56 . K. V. , p . 1 f. 
4 
Cf. A.K.V., p. 150, 
511A statement is logically necessary if a.nd only if the contra-
diction of it is self-inconsistent." A.K.V., p. 89, 
6 
Cf. A.K.V., p. 89. 
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lyt . h'l 11A1·1 ·1 t 1 11 . ana . 1..c, .· w 1. e · • .men are necessar1. y mor a s. is explicitly analytic • 
Since necess.ity is used in the sense of ·1ogical necessity, the relation-
ships of meanings are determinants of whether a particular statement is 
one which makes a necessary assertion. Such relationships in and of 
themselves are not, however, sufficient for the determination of analytic 
truth. 
Definition and classification. The relationships of meanings·are 
not fixed (and therefore not necessary) until definitions have been made 
and. accepted. Analytic statements.are ·certified by means of the•~ 
fini.tive meanings ·of the terms involved in. addition to .the syntactic 
structure of the statement. However, the definitions themselves-~ 
be analytically certain; otherwise, all that is inferred from them would 
not be analytically true. 7 Such·definitions must be fixed, and, at the 
same time, B.21 be dependent upon linguistic conventions alone for.their 
meanings. Definitive meanings must .also be intensional,.because an ana-
.lytic statement is independent of any empirical matter of fact, and this 
consideration would eliminate the denotative mode of meaning from con-
sideration here. Also, since such ftxed definitions determine the relation-
ships of meanings present in analytic statements, the linguistic mode of 
intensional meaning cannot be used. The necessary definitive meanings; 
are thus those of the sense meaning mode of intension. 
Once the definitional meanings are fixed, all analytical state-
ments which are consistently derived from the definitions will be true 
-and certain. a priori. The definitions comprise that which ;is·given in 
an.analytically verifiable apprehension. What is asserted by·such 
7cf .. A.K.V., p. 130, 
20 
apprehensions are further ·implied relationships of meanings. The relation-
ship between the given and what is asserted in an.arialytically verifiable 
apprehension, in a word, is essentially that which.holds between implicitly 
.,and explicitly analytic ·statements. (The definition: is. implicitly ana-
lytic, andthededuced statement.is explicitly analytic.) 
Of the three factors, the definitional relationships of sense 
meanings fix the other types of meaning-relations and thus provide the 
criteria of correctness for analytic statements. It is only by virtue of 
such definitions that the signification of expressions may be determined. 
f:. priori truth does·notarise from modes of classification or fromlin-
guistic formulation,·· it. arises when the definitive sense meaning relation-
ships" ..• are the basis of classification and of the application of 
. 118 lingll:istic expressions. 
Symbolic relations. Classifications andlinguistic expressions 
are fixed by the definitive sense meaning relationships; they are not, 
therefore, merely arbitrary conventions. This leaves only such symbols 
.as are used in the verbal expressions which maybe arbitrarily deter-
mined in the form of linguistic conventions. Symbols are used to repre-
sent the already fixed meaning relations, The result of such symbolism 
.is language. Again,.however, once a symbol is used to designate a par-
ticular meaning relation, that symbol has become fixed according to the 
meanings to which it refers.· When various meaning relations have been 
assigned symbols, the relationships of these symbols are expressed by 
linguistic conventions. These .. linguistic expressions are analytic, and 
the symbolic relationships have intensional meaning in the mode of 
8 
A.K.V., p. 153, 
21 
. linguistic meaning. 
If the. underlying sense meanings-are taken into account, .linguistic 
conventions are seen to have constant meanings. The proposed relation-
ships between symbols can thus be validated by showing that the proposed 
relations are consistent with the constant meanings of the pertinent.lin-
guistic conventions. All fermal analytic statements . are verifiable by 
reference to definitive meanings and the relationships·which they express. 
Formal logic has .. often been taken .. as a sufficient method of certi-
:Bying .la priori truth.. Although all of those statements which belong to 
loe$icare formal analytic statements, all such statements are not included 
in logic. The only verification. of a logical system .. consists. in meeting 
the requirement that its principles must be true .la :priori. But, if the 
test of logical rules is that they be statements which are true .ia priori, 
their assurance of analytic truth ultimately is dependent upon that part 
of their meaning which is not formal. Once more,. the relatignships of 
sense meanings stand as the criteria of .la priori, .or of analytic,.truth. 
I 
In. summary, linguistic con,ventions make pos1sible • the verbal ex-
pression of meaning relations. These conventions .are a necessary factor 
because" ..• no statement could be determined as true or not, er as 
analytic or not, without reference to the verbal expression of ·it."9 
·The criteria which govern p~oper classification. are. indicated by ·the 
-intensional relations of one expression:to.another. The reference here, 
though, is still to verbal expressions. After ·meanings as :criteria _.2! 
application,have been verbalized, the relationships of verbal expressions 
are no longer mer.ely conventional,. but have become fixed. So, the final 
test.of.the .la.Priori truth of a statement lies ,in the relationships_,2! 
9A.K. V., p. 155. 
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. sense meanings. 
"[Analytic knowledge,] ..• like the meanings it.concerns, is 
essentially:independent of. linguistic formulation, though the 
modes of. linguistic expression.are a frequent .and more or less 
.reliable clue to the relatioriships of meanings so expressed. 1110 
Analytic ~ priori) knowledge ·is thus composed of those cognitions 
whose assertions are verifiable in.terms of their intensional meanings, 
Cognitions which are not so verifiable but require>~ relaticm of mean-
ing·to particular expt:!rience form.the content of empirical knowledge. 
Analytic knowledge .holds for all possible (consistently· thinkable) uni-
verses, while empirical knowledge is only of what actually,is the case, 
In. ,a word, the distinction between analytic and empirical knowledge is 
that between what can be ·known .!a. priori and what cann0t be so known, 
.Empirical Knowledge 
As·was noted.at the beginning of the first chapter, empirical 
reality (reality external to the individual) does not need t.o be proven; 
· .. it needs only to be • acknowledged. The. problem of empirical. knowledge 
11
• • • is not to prove the objectively ·real and the possibility' 
of our empirical cognition of it, but to formulate correctly 
those criteria which delimit empirical.reality.and explicate 
f 't 1111 our sense o . 1 • . 
Lewis' solution of this problem.includes the elements of empirical cog-
nition, empirical judgments, and the distinction between verification and 
justification. 
Empirical cognition. Empirical cognitions cannotbe validated or 
certified.as knowledge except ultimately.through sense experience, .rn 
10 A,K.V., P• 167; · 
11 361. · A,K.V., P• 
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general, an empirical cognition,contains what is given in experience 
.-and. the inte.rpretati0n placed upon the given by mental activity as. well 
as the assertion made upon the basis of the experience at.hand. 
The element of sense experience which , is .!19..i dependent upon any 
.mentalactivity.is. 11the given." The .given cannot be verbally described 
since this, in,itself, would require mental activity. It is an.abstrac-
tion,, but this _in no way diminishes its importance to empirical cogni-
l2 
tion.. The giveil is always constant .and remains so even ·though different 
. interpretations may be placed upon :it, The given is thus that element in 
experience which, is not created by thinking .and. cannot generally/be dis.:. 
·.13 · 14 11 11 placed or·altered ; it. is simply given, The given, as an.abstracted 
element, . is not to be found. in, isolation, but is identifiable only/in 
15 
experience. 
The given is recognized by means of. gualia, Lewis introduces.this 
term to describe -11 , • .recognizable qualitative characters of the given, 
• 1116 
which may'be repeated in different experiences. It is by means of 
gualia that awareness of the given is possible, Qualia are, however, 
entir.elysubjective and.immediate. Thus, they do not have anytemporal 
duration (although they are repeatable in exp.er:Lence). and cannot be the 
obje,c1~ ,gf ·knowledge . 
.. 1211 
. . the condemnation of abstractions. ·is the condemnation of 
. . 
thought. itself. Nething t_hat thought can ever comprise .is other i:;han 
. some abstraction which ,cannot exist in, isolation. 11 M. W. O.,. p. 55. 
13 Cf. M, W. 0. , p. 48. 
l~"It is of the essence of what will be meant by 'the given' that 
it 1:ihould be .given." M,W,O,, p. 65. . . 
15 Cf. M. W. 0; , p. 66 
l6 
· · -M.w.o., p. 12i. 
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•In analyzing empirical.knowledge 
"our interest is .•. in the.element of givenness.in what we 
may,_ for usual and .commonplace reasons, mark off as -'an ex-
perience' or 'ah object. ' This given element . in a single ex- 1 
-perience of an, object is what will be meant by a -presentation. ' 11 7. 
A presentation is thus composed of a guale or of a complex of gualia, 
However, while·gualia are recognizable from ene experience to another, 
.a.presentationis.unique. 
-A presentation, since it is composed of gualia (which are immediate, 
complete,_ and thus in no need of further verification), is•not-cognitive, 
However, when categories are applied to a presentation, meaning-relations 
are introduced by which one experience may·be·compared with,another. 
Such meaning-relations applied.to sense presentations enable one to make 
assertions about something other than-the immediate experience. These 
-assertions-are empirical judgments. The _presentatiens•pro:vide the 
II , 11 · · 
sensery·cues to empirical knowledge, but the cognitive·significance of 
_ an empirical apprehension does not -lie -in the givenness of sensory cues 
18 
alone;.it lies in such predictions as are·based upon them. 
Empirical judgments. Empirical judgments may be stated, generally, 
in one of two possible ways: eitherhyi;,otheticallyor·categorically. 
When an empirical judgment is expressed in-the_ form of a hypothetical 
statement,.the prediction or assertion of the judgment co;ncerns the cen-
sequences of a particular action. A judgment of this type is verifiable 
by,- acting in the proposed manner ·and noting the consequences. · Such. a, 
judgment might be expressed.in the following fashion: 11If·I find myself 
.. 17 
M.w.o., PP• 59-60. 
18 Cf •. A.K.V., p. 178. 
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in a given situation, then, if I follow a particular course of action, 
specific consequences of that.action will occur." or, "Given situ.ation 
s, if . .action A is performed, consequent C will result, 1119 Any empirical 
jud,gment of this type is capable of being .conclusively.·verified, and a 
.conclusively verifi1:1ble ~mpirical judgment.is called.a "terminating 
judgment." These judgments always entail a " •.• prediction of a par-
20 
ticular passage of experience. 
Most empirical judgment:s are concerned with objective properties of 
events, and things raiiher than with consequences of particular modes of 
action. These judgnients may be stated categorically;.for example, it 
may be asserted that Xis a property of Y, Such judgments of objective 
fact.are called."non-terminating judgments" because there are always 
further verifications which can never be actually carried out. 
Although non-terminating judgments cannot be conclusively verified, 
this does not. imply. that they, are intrinsically unverifiable, What is 
implied here is that while everything included in a non-terminating judg-
ment is expressible by a terminating judgment, " ... no limited set of 
particular predictions of empirical eventualities can completely exhaust 
1121 
the significance of such an objective statement. 
Empirical cognitions which make categorical assertions, although 
they may never be completely verified,, nevertheless are meaningful and 
may give rise to "knowledge which is probable," The significance of 
l9Cf, .A.K.V., .pp. 173-174, 184. 
20 
· A.K.V., p. 181. It should be noted that the conclusive verification 
of consequent C is of the expected (or predicted). immediate experience of 
consequent C. 
21 
A.K. V,, p. 184. 
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empirical knowledge is for action, so such knowledge has, as one cri-
terion, the determination of the categorically stated empirical judgment 
as rationally credible. Rather than being conclusively verified,.an 
empirically verifiable apprehension needs · only to be ·.justified. in order 
to function as knowledge. 
Verification and empirical .justification. . The distinction made 
between verification and justification in the case of empirical judg-
ments does not hold in the case· of analytic judgments, since the rational 
credibility.and the truth of analytic statements coincide, Some empirical 
"laws" are quite convincingly. justified, but they. are not (and probably 
never will be) conclusively·verified. If an empirically verifiable appre-
hension is rationally credible, then one may proceed . .!§.:if the assertion 
of the cognition were true. This does not suggest, however, that all 
further attempts to verify such a cognition should summarily cease, 
Even awell.,..justi,fied cogniti~nmay be shown, at some later date, .to be 
incorrect. 
The objective beliefs (non-terminating judgments) are practical 
judgments, and the characteristic motives of empirical knowledge are con-
cern for as yet tb· be verified assertions. According to Lewis, 
"It is the function of empirical judgment to save us the 
hazards of actions without fbresight. And in this fact 
lies _th~ si~nificance of the ~u~tif~cation. of11~owledge 
as d1st1ngu1shed from the ver1f1cat1on of it. 
A prime consideration in dealing with the validity of empirical 
24 
knowledge is whether·an empirical cognition is warranted or justified, 
22cf. 4 .. A,K, V., p. · 
23 A.K. V., p. 257, 
24 II . II Cf. Lewis, The G~ven Element in·Empirical Knowledge, Philosophical 
Review (LXI, 2; 1952), .p. 174. 
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.Empirical.judgments.are genefallybased.upon past experience, 25 and past 
experience: is given, fil_ ·~ moment . .2!: cognition, in the form of imagi~·· 
nation; and, any repprts of. the experience of others will be data given 
26 
in our own first-person. experience. Thus, 
" .. ,when .knowledge is envisaged,.as it must be, from within 
the egocentric predicament, all objects known or conceived 
must reveal· themselves.as. constr4ctions2 eventually, from data given·in first-person experience." 7 
Since empirical judgments are made from within -the egoc.entric pre-
dicament .and generalizations.are made on the basis of data brought .from 
.memory, empirical knowledge is not certain--it · is probable, This does 
..!!21 mean, however, that there is no certainty: to be found .. anyw-here in· 
the structure of empirical knowledge. Both the definitional relations 
brought to the experience and the presentational element of the experi-
~nce2 are, in and.of themselves, certain. It is the·interpretation 
place.d upon the presentation. i;hat is subject· to error. and, . in the case 
of empirical cognitions, requires justification. 
That our knowledge of empirical reality:-is probable does not affect 
. the' certainty of the experienced presentations (when they. are experienced) , 
nor does it.affect the certainty of objective reality;itself. ,All em-
pirical generalizations finally.refer to some_presentation (or set of 
,presentations) . The justification of an interpretation placed upon a 
presentation must take place after. the presentation is experienced;.so, 
at the stage of justification, .the presentation is no•longer·immediate, 
25"rt is obvious that, in general, the important ground of empirical 
belief is past experience of like cases." .,A.K.V., p. 259. 
26 . "Ex . " 4 
· Lewis, . perience .and Meaning, op cit., p .. 1 2. 
27 
. Ibid, p. 129, 
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but is remembered and. is no l0nger certain, Thus, there are two m0ments 
. - in .empirical, knowledge: .).) the moment of' c0gniti0n, and· 2) the moment 
of justification ... :And, the moment .of cognition. is distinct from the 
moment of justification.' .. In znaking precisely this. point, Lewis states 
that 
11 
, • [ emp:i;J;,ical] . knowing begins an.d ends., in experience;. but 
it does :not eridin the experience in which.it begins. Hence 
the .emphasis 0n the temporal structure of.the.knowing process, 
the leading character of. ideas, and the function of knowledge 
. "d t. t· rr2e as a guie o. ac ion. 
That empirical knowledge is always from ,with.in the egocentric pre-
dicament .appears to be in,contradiction to the assertion of tp.e·inde-
. pendence of. its object. Lewis contends, however, that such relativity 
. is .not contradictory to, ". . . but requires an independent character in 
1129 
what is thus relative. . · Although what is known is .,known only,· in terms 
of some·. relation, such ·relative knowledge is 
II 
, . true knowledge of .. that independent character which, 
together ·,;,;rith·the other-term or terms of this relat:i,onship, 
determines this content of our relative knowledge .I-130 
The point Lewis has in mind. is simply. that in the abs~,11ce of· anticipation 
: Ji 
of future experience, there can be no knowledge of igd~pendent reality; 
. and, therefore, . the content of 'knowledge . has an element which, is·. inde-
31 pendent of the mind, Thus, one ·must be careful to .avoid concluding 
that.the limitations of the egocentric predicament apply.to the objects 
28Toi"d, 4 p. 13 , 
29 
. M,W,O,, .p. 172, 
JO 
M.w.o., PP· 172-173. 
31rf th ib • t f · · · , kn l d " t d t . d · · e o Jee o empirica.... . ow e ge . . . were no · e ermine 
by a coridition.which,is independent 0f the mind,.it would.not be deter-
" d t · II 8 mine a all. . M; W. 0. , , p. l 7, 
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of ·knowledge, If these limits were so-applied, the distinction which 
has been made between cognitive and non-cognitive experiences would have 
to be discarded, Such limit1:1.ti_bns are rather ·restrictions to be recog-
nized as applying only to our individual knowledge of objective reality. 
_.Since ". • ,knowledge always transcends the immediately given, "32 
and since knowledge, due to the,limitations i1nposed by the egocentric 
predicament, .i_s in terms of one's own cognitive experiences, there must 
be some means which enable one to distinguish between what is real .and 
what is imaginary, or ". . • between that which is . apprehensible to me 
1133 
alone and "the object apprehended by us·in comm.on. 
It is t.he pure --concept that provides the matrix which serves .as the 
context.in which-meaningful relations betweenthe·sensual and the mental 
.· are formed; . i. e . , . the pure concepts are . the definitive meaning relations 
up0n which our judgments are based, Thus, Lewis defines the pure concept 
as 
II 
.• a definitive structure of meanings, which is what would 
verify completely,tp.e coincidence of two ro.inds when they under-
rrj4 stand each other bys.'the use of ·language. 
Without the concept, imagery could not be distinguished from the sen"'.". 
suously-given, and there could be no conceivable verification of empir-
ical c0gnitions. Empirical knowledge, therefore, is possible only.in 
the presence of concepts. 
That there are psychological and.physiological differences between 
. . . 
.persons d0es ·not affect the possibility 0f the use of concepts ·with ·a 
_32 B M, W. 0. , . p. 11,_ • 
331· • 11E · d Me · 11 . ewis, . xperience . an . aning. op cit. p. 130. 
34 . 
M. W,O, ,p. 89. 
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view toward common, or shared,.knowledge. To paraphrase one of Lewis' 
examples, it is evident that discriminatory acuity varies markedly from 
one individual to the he:x:t. . If someone mentions "red, 11 the· sensation 
received by A is probably not the same as that received by B; however, 
this does not pr.event A and. B from "pointing" to. the first band of the 
. . . . II II 35 
sun's spectrfun when asked to point to the red band. In this case, 
each·person's concept of "red" is the same definitive structure of 
• • th • d f • • t • . f II d 11 • d. t • 1 36 meanings;. 1.. e., . e1.r e 1.n1. 1.ons o re . are · 1. en .1.ca . 
Thus, community of meaning maybe verified by definitions of terms 
or by behavior which demonstrates the denotation of terms. By the proper 
application of either verifying.procedure, feelings and imageries of 
individual subjects are distinguished from conceptual meaning in gen'."' 
eral. This does not imply, however, that each individual doe.s not 
correlate concepts with sense data or imagery. On the contrary, such 
correlation by the individual is necessary; but, whether such· individual 
correlations are shareable is completely irrelevant to the possibility 
of common meanings. It is the abstraction called the concept which must 
be made if there is.to •be any common understanding or common knowledge 
of objective reality. 
Lewis readily,adniits_that community of meaning and genuine common 
understanding c1reabstractions and are more ideal than realized; but 
he also.insists that concepts,." .•. as precisely such abstractions, 1137 
35cf .. M.w.o., PP· 74-75. 
3611 
, You and I mean the same by 'red' if we both define it as the 
first band of.the sun's spectrum, and if we both pronounce the same 
objects _to be red." M.w.o., p. 76. 
37 
. M. W. 0. , p. 89. 
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.are, the fundamental grounds upon which our interpretations of our "cem-
mon world'' are based. In summary, Lewis asserts that 
II . . 
In .general,we are able to understand one.another beca1+se--
for one reason--a common·reality:is presented to.us, But so 
to put it is to reverse the order of knowletlge. We have a 
comm.on ·reality because--or · in so far as:.-we are able to 
·identify, each in his owri experi~gce, those sy.stems of orderly 
r:elation,ind.icatedby behavior."j 
_38 ' '' M.w.o., p:f?,.110-111. 
CHAPTER III 
VALUATION 
Tne question of whether any cognition is correct or incorrect is 
essentially the question of whether the cognitive judgment is right or 
wrong. Right and wrong may be taken in different senses, not the least 
of which is the moral sense, In fact, the most frequent signification 
of right and wrong is the moral signification. However, although the 
morally, right is regarded as one type of right, " ... it cannot forth~ 
111 
with be identified with right in general. So, a cogent discussion of 
the morally right must wait upon an expository discussion of Lewis' 
value theory. And, he has developed his conception of the nature of 
values and valuation in terms of their relation to action. 
Behavior, action, and act. "Action, " like " . " experience, can be 
used in many different senses, It is often used in a narrower sense 
than tha.t which Lewis takes. Action (activity) refers to any self-
governe~ process, whether that process . is physical, mental, or a combi-
nation of both. While activity may be mental as well as physical, Lewis 
• II 1111 
assigns- to act, .a narrower designation inapplicable unless some-
112 thing physical is brought about. He goes on to assert that the 
1Lewis, ~ Ground and Nature .2f the Right. (Columbia University 
Press, 1955), .p. 10. In, subsequent references, ~ .Ground and _Nature 
Qi'.. the Right will be abbreviated G.N.R. 
2 G.N.R., p. 15, 
32 
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consequences of an act are not confined to the merely physical, but may 
also include the effects which an act might have on the experience of 
others (this type of effect is of prime moral importance) . 3 
Since action refers only to that behavior over which the doer is 
able to exert some control, there must be some intent and purpose for 
an act to be initiated. The intent of an act (which is also the intent 
) II of the doer is the entire expected result of the act, and That part of 
the intent of an act for the sake of which it is adopted; we shall call 
114 its purpose. 
Value judgments. Evaluation essentially consists of assigning a 
value to the expected result of an act. This involves a judgment--a 
decision of the value to be assigned to the expected consequences of the 
act in question;. The judgment is correct or not according to whether 
the actual consequences of the act "live up" to the expectations in-
volved. Inasmuch as value judgments are either correct or incorrect 
and stand in need of justification of their assertions (which assertions 
are about something which is not immediately given in the cognitive ex-
perience itself), they are cognitive. 
Since evaluation is cognitive, the question arises as to whether 
evaluative cognitions are to be classed as empirical only, analytical 
only, or as both empirical and analytical. That evaluative cognitions 
may be empirical can be seen from Lewis' statement that 
II 
... no intention or purpose could be serious and no action 
could be practically justifiable or attain success, if it were 
not that there are value-predictions which represent empirical 
3cr. G.N.R., ,~. 15. 
4 A.K.V., p. 367. 
· c~gnition~, and ;.are ~redMtive and :·hence capable of confirma .. 
tJ.on or disconfir.mation.. · . . · · .· 
4 
.3 
EmpiricalknEiwle(lge ba~ed upon evaluative cognitions consists of practi-
CialllL, justified evalUli.tive judgments, which, in turn, are rationally 
warranted beliefs. 
. . 
To facilitat.e the present discussion of empirical value judgments, 
an operational definition of values is needed. "vaiue" is used by 
Lewis II... ;exclusively in ,1:;he sense of a value-quality, value-character 
or value-property of something, or of a,~ of value-quality, ,character 
. '~ . 
or ·property. · .· .Values :are .. ·thus realized or thought of only, as .characters 
of some specific thing or kind.of thing; 
There is one·C<,:)ncept which must.be clarified.in order to present a 
cogent discussion of evaluation: the concept of Sensibility, as _,it is 
applied to.· action. arid to· an .. act. An .action is. said. to pe sensible if 
and only,, if. the expected ·.result has comparative value. · Comparative 
value refers·tocontemplated alternatives where one alternative:is 
. . 
selected.as havi:t1g~orevaluepotential than,the other pessible.alter'.'" 
natives. So, an, intent is sensible if the. expected result is i;he one 
which has ·comparative value ascribed to it, and. an act is sensible if 
and only.iif .. its intent is sensible. 7 It ,is only.,,a sensible actien 
whfoh,.is capable of being successful; and in -.order to be considered as 
successful, the expectation of resulting coIIl!)arative ,value must be 
. . . 
practically'justified by.the result obtained 1yhen·the act iS performed, 
5 . A, K, V., pp. 371-372, 
6 
. A,K,V., p. 393, 
7cf. ,A,K,V. ·PP• 366-367. 
So, an act is successful 
II 
... only as far as the purpose of it altogether is realized; 
so far as a hoped-for va8ue-quality accrues by way of an in-
tended specific resUlt." 
35 
There are value-predications which are representative of empirical cog-
nitions; but, the question of whether there are any value-predications 
which represent analytic cognitions remains to be considered, 
As in the case of empirical knowledge in general, analytic state-
ments contribute to evaluative activity. Analytic statements concern-
ing values are necessary if only for the reason that explication requires 
the use of language, and sometimes even the language must be explained, 
The use of analytic statements in evaluative activity serves only to 
clarify·the real issues involved by sorting out those considerations 
which are :merely verbal. The most important .function of the logical 
element in evaluative cognitions has to do with the explication of the 
significations of value-terms. The logical element serves as a means of 
explicating 
" ... one intension by another and more familiar or more lucid 
meaning; and thus delimit~s] the essential nature of what is 
named and is· in question. 19 
Although rationally warranted beliefs may be analytic as well as 
empirical, since value-predications represent empirical cognitions, 
more is involved than meaning-relations alone. The justification of 
all value judgments lies in the consequences of acts, which, in turn, 
have resUlted from the evaluative cognitive activity. While there must 
be an analytic element in evaluative cognitions, analytic statements 
8 
A. K. V,, p. 370. 
9 
. A.K.V., p. 379. 
are solely statements about the valuable and, at most, provide a schema 
or model for evaluations. Analytic statements, in and of themselves, 
are not evaluative statements; nor are analytically verifiable cognitions 
evaluative cognitions. 
Objective and subjective value-predication. A major problem which 
arises in a discussion of moral evaluations involves the distinction 
of 11 , •• the question what basic good is and what goods are derivative, 
from [ the] question of. the subjectivity or objectivity of value-
1110 predications. It is the second of these questions which is of 
immediate interest, 
A guide to the subjectivity or objectivity of value-predications 
is found in the types of empirical.statement which Lewis has suggested. 
Since value judgments are empirically verifiable judgments, it follows 
that there will be value-predications which correspond to each of the 
three types of empirical.statement. 
The first type .of empirical statement·is simply an expression of 
what is immediately given .. As in .a non-evaluative case, such a state-
ment concerning an evaluation does not represent a cognitive judgment. 
It represents that which,is immediate and complete in itself, An ex-
ample of a statement about the immediately valuable. is the follow-ing: 
As one·is listening to the music from a Tchaikovsky ballet, he suddenly 
exclaims, 11This is good!" This statement has no further need of veri-
fication and could be false only if the person were lying about his 
experience. This type of statement, obviously, is.an entirely subjec-
tive description of what is·innnediately,given and no assertion is made 
10 4 A, K. V,, p, 37 , 
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concerning anything other than what is immediately experienced. · 
If, on t_he · other hand, the statement, ''If I put this record on the 
record player, then I will enjoy a good performance of the music from a 
Tchaikovsky ballet" is made, a second type of empirical statement of an 
evaluation is evidenced. This type·of statement is of a. verifiable cog-
nition which, at the moment of cognition, is not verified. Verification 
of such a statement depends upon the results of a specified act . (that of 
putting this record on the record player). The demand for empirical 
verifiability of the statement designates it as an expression of ·an em-
pirical evaluative judgment and thus as a statement of a cognition. The 
judgment represented by this type of statement is capable of complete and 
decisive verification, which consists of performing the specified act and 
noting the consequences. Empirically verifiable evaluative judgments 
which are capable of complete and decisive verification are thus termi"° 
11 
nating evaluative judgments~ 
The third -type of, empirical statement--those which are concerned 
with properties of events and objects--may also be of evaluations. 
"The LondonStymphony O~chestra presents very enjoyable concerts." is an 
example•of this type of statement. Whether the London ·symphony Orchestra 
presents very enjoyable concerts is a. matter which may never be completely 
anddecJsively verified, The statement, nevertheless, is still meaningful, 
and, in appropriate situations, may serve as.a.guide for human acts. Evalu-
atio:hs of the properties. of events and objects are· expressed categorically, 
and the judgmeilts referred to in such instances are to be ·classified as 
non-terminating evaluative judgments. As is the case with non-terminating 
11cf. supra. , p. 25. 
. . . -·.. . - ·.. . ···.·.~ ; <:... ·.· .. _·.· .. · .. . : ·; 
. jud~n't;s ;in·gener~i,. there .is nothirig in.a: ri,m:.ter~inatipg .evaluative· 
. juq.gment which is ribt e~ressibl~; in terms of some, te~minai~ng evaluative 
juqgment. · 
... ·· .. · .·. : . 
. · .. · . · .. · ,, ." 
, . -Practical arid mbral .i~stif:i.c~ti'c,n'; ·'fil.~ j4stificfatia.dp. :of ,a 'c:agri.it:i ve 
eva1uation I'e<luir~s ;mor~ than do ·t1ie ;jtistitJ~'a:tions o:f non~~va1uatlve•·. ··· 
cognitive. ·jµdgments. ..In• addition· t,o. showing th:e• cor:C:ectne·s.sCof··:pre:- - ••. 
(·dictions of obje~~i"lfe 9(i)nsequehces: oi.acts" justtf:i.c:ation:s. of ev,,alulitive .· 
. judgmerit's miis't ,als0 she~ •the: C¢I'r:ectneis ef the ¢xpected degree of ~atis~ .· 
faction te the d~er; $µell satisf'acti(jn,. ot cour:~ei; is a ,p~rt ot: th~ . con-
··,sequences of ,a~:ac( which ii ::pased,;, :at least in. pa:t, µpqn:• 0a ··value- . 
predication. ; F~r;:,the' ;purpose :of' this_ disCtission,:the ·1atter · type•· of . 
. j~stification 1vi1i.:\e<termed ''moral justificati(;j~,:11: e;en :though-~uch. · .. 
. . ·· .. ,. ·. ..· 
:justifig\at:ions ~IJr;;necessar'y. in :the .cas'e Qt .any .cogIIitive ~.,;a:t:uat'iori. 
Sht6·e. moral' J~stifjc;t±on . giffers froni practibaL ju;ti:f'ica.tion,,- .··., 
. . . . ·., . .·. . ' ... ,; . . . . 
. it .foliew~. i;bat there m~st be some, real diff~rence .bi9t1'J'een 'the a~S:i.gn-
ing pf"yaluesJ~:nd the as~:±gniiient)&r qtper prepe~ti,~s t~ ·o~j·ects' arid .. 
events, - A I?recise 'statement of the diffe;r-ence ,. howev~~, must be in 
terrils-·: of vti~ue :typ~, _. efi in. L<=~~f3,''::;termiri:01ogy.{ ... 
''The ·Ilia~;;!' in which thi~ 'd'ifference ofthe' ascripti<i>n o:f value 
to 0.bject~ 'frc,m predications of: other :properties,' niay b~ pre.;.; . 
·.· ::!cie!!t:!1!;f!f~!l.tt!f,n!~wa::·Of,':t~r .~-~s'.~fnctie~:be~~ee?: i.ntpinsic .· 
•. '. l' 
·.' A more .thor9ugh discu:ssi6n of y~iue-pfed:i.ca'tion,. particularly of mq~al · 
. . 
(ei/:a'.l:,Uaty.>n,>~S,,.th~s d~perid~nt: upon an expos:i.tio~ of',_the Value typefLwhich 
·--h~ve ~e~n di~ting~f~hed- by; tewis. 
· Ho"1evet;, i: it • shE>uld be, ,'.n0ted ;here. th.at a C!?>griit.:ion nll3y be practi~ally, · • 
. . ., .· . . 
but ·not mor~lly justified; f.)r, it .may be :morally,,bu( not practicall;y' 
.· . ' ; . . ·.:' l,.- ·.' . . ' - ........ '" 
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justified. If I should decide to play a particular rec0rdbecause I 
expect to gain satisfaction from hearing Belafo:hte sing 11Dcilia," then 
the evaluative cognition, of which this decision :Ls a part, may fail to 
be justified in either of two ways: 1) if I play the record and do not 
gain the expected,satisfi;lction, or 2) if I play the record and it is not 
of Belafonte singing. "Delia," .An evaluative judgment must be justified 
in both aspects in order for the cognition in question to be called know-
ledge. Of course, in the case of moral evaluation, the expect·ed feelings 
. , . . . II . . 1113 
of the doer will be of goodness . 
Since the judgment of an evaluative cognition involved the attri-
but ion of a value to· an object or to an event, the question arises con-· 
cerning whether values are subjective or objective. . As. value judgments 
14 
are always empirical, values themselves cannot be·!_ priori. .If values 
are predicated of objects, then it follows ·that justification of such 
valuation would show the value in question to be a property of the object 
and thus objective. On thei other hand, the '.'feeling'' involved in the 
justification of an evaluative judgment leads to the conclusion that 
things are valuable only.relative to some subjective feeling; i.e., 
that values are subjective and that we call something valuable only if 
. . 
it appears to be valuable. There are .two problems, then, which must now 
be considered: 1) the predication of objective value to objects·and 
events, and 2) the · anterior problem of " ·. the nature qf value as 
13· 
· Cf, A.K.V,, pp. 394-396. 
1411The supposition that 'values are·!,·priori' could arise only 
through confusion,between apprehension of ·a meaning itself and appre-
hensionth!3t this meaning has application in a particular instance," 
A.K. v., p. 380. . .. 
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. 1115 immediate and prized. 
Extrinsic and 1ntrinsic value, In .so far as all valuatibns are in 
the form of. empirical judgments, cognitive valuatibns involve the assign-
ment of values to·objects and events. Such objeci:;s 8nd events are valu-
able either in and of themselves, or they are valuable in the sense of 
being useful or instrumental in bringing about some futur~ desideratum. 
The latter type of value is called extrinsic value, while values of the 
former type are·called intrinsic values, 
In most cases of the predication of extrinsic value tb an object or 
event, the truth of such value predication requires 
" ... that the something else, to which the thing in question 
is instrumental, should have intrinsic value; or at least be in 
turn instrumental to some still further thing having intrinsic 
worth. 1110 · 
A predication of extrinsic value is generally of the form: Xis useful 
for, , or instrumental to, Y. However, in this general form, there is no 
necessary inference that Y has any genuine value. Thus, Lewis asserts 
that ". . .A has extrinsic value. . . only if B (or some eventual Z to 
which it may lead) has intrinsic value."17 Judgments that merely 
assert that Xis instrumental to, or useful for, Y, with no implication 
of the certainty that Y (or some eventual thing) has some intrinsic 
value, are~ to be classified as judgments of extrinsic value. From 
this it follows that something may have utility and .£21 have extrinsic 
value; but, any extrinsic or instrumental value of an object or event 
15 
. A. K. V. , p. 400. 
from Dewey, but he does 
which Dewey gave to it. 
16 A.K.V., p. 383. 
17 8 A,K,V., p. 3 5, 
Lewis admits having borrowed the term, "prized," 
not claim to be using the term in the same sense 
Cf., :A,K.V., p. 398. 
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is also part: of' the utility of it.· So, the assertion that something .. 
has ut.iJ.ity does not necessarily imply that it also has extrinsic value. 
The first.distinction of intrinsic from extrinsic value made above 
suggested that the intrinsic·.value · of an object. or, event is realizable 
finally in that object or event ;in itself, There is a difficulty-here 
' 
. II , 
that must be noted and clarified concerning the phrase, -valuable in_ 
and of itself." When something is called valuable·in and of itself, 
: \, 
what is :meant is that something is intrinsically valuable, not literally 
valuable for it.s_ own sake, but because. its values are II. , .realized, 
or :realizable, in experience :through presentation . s:··-~ _thing ,12 whic~ 
they_are. attributed·."18 .. Thus, an .object inay possess .. intrinsic value so 
far·as.such•ascribed value·is realizable-in the presence of that to, or 
for, which ·the object (or event) i.s instrumental, or useful, 
Values, whether extrinsiG 0r intrinsic, are finally disclosed in 
experience ... -Thus, . the distinction ,between i;he • assignment of values and 
the assignm~nt of other properties. to things can be explicated by ·saying 
11
• . • • values ascribable .12 ob.jects .~ al.ways extrinsic values; 
_intrinsic value attaching exclusively.to reali~ations of some 
possible value..-q_uality. in experience itself. 111 
' . . 
In othe~ words, Lewis is simply stating that if a i;hing has extrinsic 
yalue,.then that thing has the capability of providing some possible 
. goodness • in experience. The distinction between value predications 
and predications. of ot~er ·properties. lies in the opservation that .. a value 
may.·be ·. correctly understood in terms of language expressing the experi-
enciilg.:; of -the·· immediately given; other objective properties .cannot be 
18 . 
386. ·· . A, K, V., p . 
. l9A KV 
. . . . . ' . p. 389 . 
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' ' 
correctly understood through expressive t~rminologyralone, but,.in order 
to be understoed, must be in .terms of a cognitive stai;ement (hypethetical 
or categorical) • 
. Another. distinction ef value types follows. immediately from the 
ab.eve discussion ef intrinsic and.extrinsic values: ·that ef·inherent 
. and•• instrument.al value. Very.·briefly; an. instrumental Vl:llue of something 
is the value realized through the presentatipn of that something else .te 
which the thing·. in question is.· instrumental. The · inherent value of some-
thing is, of course, the value realized in the pres·entation of. that thing. 
One point te ·be noted here. is i;hat semething may. be both extrinsically 
. and. intrinsically. valuable, or have inherent .as well as. instrumental 
value. 
All values which are resident.in objects and events.are extrinsic, 
' ' ' 
but this clas·sificati~n must be- subdivided, in order ·to describe more 
fully the' yariety. of value-.qualities found. in experience. From ·this 
point throughout the remainder of this thesis, the c0ncern will be not 
.so much with·yalues in general, but with moral values and.moral valu-
.ation. 
CHAPTER I:V 
LEWIS' SYSTEM OF MORAL PRINCIPLES AND VALUES 
·. · II , . ·II · II II When the question arises concerning ~he u~es of right and: wrong 
it is the moral sense in which these terms' are usually taken. And, it 
.. is the morally right and wrong which will be the primary concern, here • 
. The right and the morally right. Although it is· important, all 
that.is accomplished when.logical analysis is applied to.the.determin-
' ati0n·of right .is.a justification.of a decision through·the application 
of the, test of consistency. An inconsistency indicates a faulty con-
clusion, but .a consistent argument does not prove the rightness Qr 
1 
truth of the conclusion. A consistent argument claims onlythat the 
conclusion is as probable as the premisses involved. Such premisses are 
found, particularly in ethical considerations, to be beliefs, Hence, 
the rightness of the conclusion is dependent upon the rightness of. the 
underlying beliefs. 
Lewis has asserted that '!whatever is decidable or can be determined 
by deliberation is right or wrong.112 Since both the moral and practical 
justifications of a value judgment d.epend upon the consequences of. an 
act, judgments of the morallyright are also tobe·determined.as justi-
fied pr not accorqing to such consequences, Thus, empi;ricaldata, as 
. 
1cf. G.N,R,, p. 27. ''Rightness" is used synonymously with ''correct-
ness" here. 
2 
G.N.R., p. 30. 
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well .. as .analytical_ criticism, are .needed for the positive justification 
' . 3 
of any ·belief., 
· -The ·morally:,right, then, <is predicated ef acts; the censequencesof. 
. . . ·. , .. · 
which serve. as the·mo;ral and practical justtfications of particular:yalue 
judgments. Hewever, since·, 11The field of jµdgment .of right . and wrong ex-
tends to whatever, is subject te human, deliQer~tion or calls for decision, 114 
the morally-right must be delimited. There must be:some< character ef. the 
predictable• c0ns.equeI1ces of acts which, when. the act. is committed, will 
lllake the act.in que~tion eii;her right or wreng. Lewis assigns this.:as 
the .. principal prebl~m ,of ethics which .arises when ,a choice. ef.: acts con-
fronts the individual. In Lewi.s I terminology:, 
. "Solution to the central problem of ethics requires us te 
determine what-character of the consequences. of action it.is 
by.ref~;ence.to which one act will be.right and.another 
wrong'. . .. . . 
. Ob.iective and sub.iective right. Prior to discussing the "central" 
problem of ethics,. it .would be. welrto distinguish objective from -sub-
. jective right. · As all questions of the morally ·right . are -concerned with 
acts.and .since the content.of an:act.consists solely of theconsequences 
of· its ce:mmitme:g.t~.: . t,he distinction of objective. from: subjective -.right 
. . . . 
', . .·· .,, 
must :lie. in the judgment upon which. an.act .is ,based, -
If ·an .act . is : ebjectively right, .it must be · so regardless of'. opinien 
or any other subjective consideration alone. The judgment which serves 
.as the.impetus for-an objectively right act.is correct or-incorrect in 
.3 ' . . .... ' ' ;· ... 
Cf. A.K~v. , .. PP.~:. 37 .. .38 .• 4 . ' ·. ~ 
. G,N,R,,. p. 9. 
5 .· 
', G.N.R,, pp, 61;.(52, 
6 
... Cf, G,N.R., p. 47. 
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·-,r'. .-• 
the same· sense as any. ether ·cegnitive judgment 0f· empirical matt.ers -ef. 
fact. Thus, an -ebjectiv~ly right act is c:me ·which,.• en ·the basis of ·the 
,given evidence, II, •. _is judged that its cense(luences arecsU:ch as:'.it·::will 
. .· . . . 117: 
be right -t0 · ·br_i:pg · · ~beut, and that . judgment is . correct .. · 
_An act . is· subjectively right . i_f, in ·tl:le j~dgment . of the doer., it is 
. I .. . . , 
right t0 ·bring ab0ut, · Whether er :net !the judgment .. is justified is beside 
. . . ·.' - .. 
the peint. A judgment -leading te a sJbjectively,:right .act ~Y- be based 
entireiy ·upon .. ill-founded opinien . whi_ch disregards ·much • ef ..• the given 
evidence;. and tho1;1gh the judgment may be incorrect, th~ ,act. in ([Uestion 
Jllay remain SUbjectively right, II, , , an act iS SUbject:tvely .. :right ·if• 
the deer thinks it is objectively right, whether his.thinking s0.•is justi-
118 fied or .·net. 
-The imp0rtant pei-nt to n0te h,ere,is that.an _act is right t0 do if 
it. is judged,,. en"~he basis 0f the give:Q. evidence, t0 be that. act which 
will provide a greater pr0pability 0f g00d.results than wi;t.l.alternative 
. acts and. if t~at judgment· is' correct. 
It is the-objective rightness of acts which-is a·maj0r·concern of 
ethics,, 11The re<[uirement te :ma,ke ·. assessment . 0f worth · and ef ·yalidi ty 
! 
/beyond .. the ·beunds ef what. is merely subjective and rela,tive te himself, 
is one which the self-c0nscie1.1s being. cannot.· set·. asi~e , 119 The. tempta-
tien to -ident:i;fy what fil(:)ral terms i?-tend·with phystcaL. cerrelates ·must 
be eliminated as must the temptatiort ta censider. ·meral, values as sub-
je(!tive enly.-~ MeI'al i~sues are among these .which .can be determined. only 
7 . ·.· 4· 
· G.N.R,, p. 9,. 
8 
.. G,N,R._, P· 49. 
. .· ; 
9Lewi~, Our Social _Inheritance (Indiana University Press,_ 19B7) P• · 49. 
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on-the .pragmatic grounds of human inclinations.and intellectual C!Spf!city 
. ti . 
. because moral terms, as is the case with all value terms, · . . .have 
their essential,. significance, finally, by reference to•the qualities of 
. . 1110 
consciousness. 
The r0le· of the good. The question of which character of the con-
sequences of acts is that which serves as the criterion of rightness 
still remains. This criterion, of course, must hold. independently of 
any subje.c.tive c<:msiderati0ns of particular acts, and that character of 
the consequences of acts must be present regardless of whether any doer 
decides to bring them about. If this were not the case, no act could be 
held to be morally.right 0r wrong. This character is usually called 
ll ll . I I.,_ I I goodness or. oadness. Without the character of goodness or badness, 
no consequences ofan act could provide justification.for a mor1;1l judg-
ment. · 
Since g0odness and badness are properties .. of the consequences of 
acts (consequences of acts are objects or events), there is, strictly 
speaking, no such thing as moral goodness or moral badness. Objects 
and. events are good or bad, but, in themselves,. they are not moral. 
Acts and the doers .0f the acts are properly called moral. . There is, 
however, .a definite relation between the good and the m0rallyright, 
. and the re.lation 1 is such that the morally right. is dependent upon the 
good, Although men.and their·acts are often called good., this sense of 
" " · good is quite different than the sense in which an object or event is 
good. As it is applied to men .. and acts, ti " good is taken in ". . . .the 
sense, namely, ofbeing usefUl; 0f contributing or being able to 
. lOTh.d 
. J. .• ' P• 83 . Cf., M.w.o., PP· 248-249. 
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cont:ribute to some desirable end. 1111 
,, 
The dete:rminat ion of rightness. ' T:tie:re are, thus, two factors in-
volved in the determination of. the rightness of an act (as far as the 
doer is concerned): .1) a rule concerning right acting, and 2) a judg-
ment of the good which is expected to be real.ized i~ the consequences of 
the act in question. 12 If the decision to act is based upon these two 
factors, . then, if the. act is carried out . and the consequences justify 
. the judgment, the act is one which is morally right. Thus,. in order to 
be a .moral person, one must attempt·to achieve the goodand, at the same 
time, knowingly conform .to the principles of right .acting. This is ex-
pressed by. Lewis in somewhat stronger terminology. in his statement that 
. "The achievement of the good is desirable but conformity,to the right is 
. t. 1113 1ll1pera 1.ve. Conformity to the right consists of following the prin-
ciple.s of right acting, and.the principles of right.acting. are the moral 
principles. 
Man, . as the self-critical animal, .. may claim the ability to make moral 
judgments which are not merely relative to his own, subjectivities. It 
is Lewis I observation that 
"If we can ask the question whether the judgments of worth · 
which we make are merely relative to our subjectivities, 
then itis.already1implied that we can determine·correctness 
of an answer to, it, and that in such answtr we c.an free our-
selves of the subjectivities suspected. 111 · 
Furthermore, the moral factors are to be admitted.as the controlling 
11 · . ,' 
· · G,N,R,, p. 63 .. 
12 . . ·.· Cf. G,N.R,, pp. 70-75, 
13G.N,R., p. 59, 
14Lewis, ~ Social !nheritance .. p. · 49. 
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factors.in human activity if there is to be any justification of such 
15 
.activity at all, In any particular question concerning right acting., 
. " ... there .is the same need to call upon accumulated social 
wisdom,. and to submit the matter to the social criticism, that 
there. is in.any other depa:ctment·of man's continuing search for 
ways to the better life."lb 
Since man lives in.a social environment, that which is right to bring 
about must take into consideration other people who will be affected J2l; 
the act as well as the doer. When predictable social consequences are 
properly· judged as good (as . the right thing to bring about) , the act in 
question is called a ,just a.ct. Thus, Lewis defines justice in the follow-
- ing manner: "Justice is 'rightness toward others affected.' "17 
The imperative of right, It is the recognition of the principles 
of right as rational that distinguishes human.activity from.all other 
behavior. Such recognition implies generalization and objectivity, 
both of which.are characteristics of rationally determinable activity. 
Since 11A reason.is a consideration which justifies: to have a sufficient 
reason for believing or doing is to be justified in so deciding. 1118 
And, the principles of right (the moral principles) are the sufficient 
.reasons for·right acting, 
The principles, as sufficient reasons for human activity, are 
rational precepts. The justification of the principles themselves . can-
not be found in acts, since acts are based, at least partially, upon the. 
151ewis, . .211!:, Social .. Inheritance, p. 109. 
16Ibid., pp. 103-104. 
17 G,N,R., p. 53, 
18 G,N,R .. ,. p. 88. 
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. principles, On the ·other. hand, the principles are not .purely subjective 
in the sense of' ·being relative te the -individual. They;,are, however, 
brought to the eval.uative cognitive experience by the mind. Thus, such 
principles are- a priori;.· and, therefore, the justification of principles 
. is net empirical, but must be A priori. . 
Imperat.i;es are not rationally derived fr-om some principle which is 
. . \ . . . . . 
s-till.mere fundamental; they are acknowledged in much the same manner as 
. . 
: is. independent reality. They are. knowable, but. they de_ .not require preef, 
only .acknowledgment •. The moral imperatiye is.:the basic principle of right 
.. upen which allether •principles of right acting rely fer ·their claims .of 
yalidity . 
. The imperatives are acknowledged by alL ratienal persc;ms,. so their 
ground must, .. in some ma:Qner, lie in .human nature, because .)'Human:nature 
calls fer principles of [correct] decision. 1119 'J;'hat character of.human 
' ., 
·nature which calls for the acknowledgment of principles .of. corre.ct ,de-
" • · ri20 cision is labelled by Lewis. the antecedent sense of rightness. 
Since te decide. is unavoid,able, the acknowledgment of such basic prin-
. . . 
ciples of correct decision, the. imperatives, is necessary. 
r • •• • • . 
·There.are -two ·fundamental characteristi_cs of all thinking: gener-
.ality and.objectivity. Consequently, all behavier vlhich•is ratienally 
. determined will .alse exhib_it these twe characteristics. Since knowledge 
,-involve's--respenses ,-t<c>- new and-.changing. situations .. and,.since- the _frame'-
w.o;t_';k.:,wllich enables one to choose between-.alternative acts on a 
19 ' · 
···· ·. G.N.R,, p. 86 • 
. 
20rt is the '' . antecedent sense 0f rightness which will, at · 
.some point, constrain any ·reas_onable. person .to ,acknewledge. [the -impera-
.tives]." G~N.R,, p. 85. :''Rightness" is used synenymously with• "correct-
'' ', . . . ness here, 
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rati0nalbasis is. built up0n .past experiences, generalizati0n frem past 
experience.s is a necessary characteristic of knowledge. Alse, since 
II • . 
.. The . pr.JJJUil'y ,and per~uasive significance. 0f. knowledge lles .in its guidance 
of action,112~ and since acts can only affect the fut~e, objectivity is 
' h t . t· f kn l d A d" t L . 11T . h a necessary c arac eris 1.c 0., ew e·ge .. ccor.1.:ng o. ewis, o weig 
the absent but represented in the ,full size of it,. and not in the. measure 
of anypresentatiena). or emotive ·feeli:ng which serves.to. intimate it, is 
t b b . t . · ; ,22 o e 0 ~ec 1.ve. · 
While Lewis :has formulated se~eral statements representing impera-
tives, .the roet .of all ef the imperatives of one's thinking and doing is 
the ~ ~ Ob.jectivity:·-
''so conduct and determine your ,activities of thinking .and 
doing, .as:ta conform any decision of them:to the objective 
actualiti1=s, as cognitively signified to you in.your·re-
presentatienal apprehension.ef them,.and net.according to 
.any;:impulsion or solicita.tion exercised by the affective 
quality of yeur ·present experience as.:immediate feeling 
1123 . · 
merely .. 
· Inasmuch as. it· is fronLthe Law of Objectivity that .all other imperatives 
· are derived, , and. since 11The peculiarly human,kind of,·life -is .. imperatively 
. ,,24 
secial, the basic imp~rative, ~hen given a meral context, is 
11
,.. • the dictate to gevern .one's activiM:es affecting other 
, ·persons, as one weuld o,if these effects of .them were ·to .be 
realized with the poignancy of the immediate--hence, in ene's 
,, , ·~5 , 
own perso;n. 
21 3. .A,K, V., _p. 
22. 
· G,N,R,, p. 88. 
23 · 
- G,N,R,, p; 89. 
24 90. · ·G,N,R., p. 
25 -- . 
,G,N,R., P• 91, 
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Since fundamental laws are the f.0rmulations of. th0se definite con-
cepts or categorical tests by which a,lone all verification and practical 
(including as well, the moral) justifications 0f cognitive beliefs. are 
made possible,. these laws are ll priori. And, as the moral imperative is 
the fundamental law governing human activity (rational behavior), the 
moral imperative. is .la priori. The moral imperative, as an .la priorLlaw, 
. is the criterion by which m0rally right acts are distinguished from 
morally wrong acts. 
Categories and definitions--hence, imperatives--:are s0cial_pr0ducts 
which have resulted from previous common experiences; and, 
"Since neither the human mind nor human experience is fixed, 
absolute, or universal, whatever is ,gpriori need not be 
universally agcepted nor is it beyond the possibility of 
alteration."2 · 
Thus, the basic moral imperative and the derivative formulations of it27 
· II . II • 
are .Japriori in a pragmatic sense. The pragmatic aspect of moral im-
peratives is present because their meanings, at least partially, are 
found in social situations and have resulted fr0m common experience. 
When the generalizations drawn from previous common experience fail to 
apply to (or to make intelligible) new situations, these generalizations, · 
even when they have resulted in imperatives (including, of course,.the 
moral imperative), may be. altered or abandoned altogether. And, the 
26L · 11 A p t · c t · f th A P · · 11 r· F · 1· d . ewis,. -..t1. · .. ragma ic. oncep ion o e . riori. n · eig an . 
Sellars, Readings .ig _Philosophical Analysis (Appleton-Century-Crofts, 
Ind., 1949),. p. 293, 
27Lewis states two such derivative formulations: 1) the Law of 
Moral _Eguality--"Take no decision of action which is .member 0f any~lass 
.of decisi0ns of doing all members of which you would call upon others 
to .avoid.'' and·) .the Law£[ Compassion-- 11Recognize, in your own action 
affecting any sentient being, that claim on your compassion which com-
-ports with its capacity to enjoy-and suffer. 11 G.N.R., pp. 92, 93. 
fact that an imperative may be altered or abandoned·in the face of new 
objective situations. in no way denies the.§. priori character of the 
imperative; or, as Lewis has asserted, 
" ... the most .fundamental laws in any category--or those 
which we regard as most fundamental--are .§. priori, even 
though continued failure to render eArperience intelligible 
might result eventgally in the abandonment of that cate-
gory altogether."2 
By formulating the rules of right acting--the moral principles in 
such a manner as to take into account both the social and rational as-
pects of human life, Lewis has presented what he holds to be a thor-
oughly rational, yet practical, cognitive ethical system. Since know-· 
ledge is for the sake of action, which, in turn, is grounded in 
evaluation, the justification of this ethical system is held to lie in 
the manner in which human knowledge is gained and in the extent of 
human knowledge. 
28Lewis, 11A Pragmatic Conception of the A .Priori.", p. 292. 
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CHAPTER V 
. . 
···LEWIS ' JUSTIFICA'I'ION OF Fj:IS ETHICAL SYSTEM 
ANDA $UGGESTED EMENDATION 
·Lewis' Justifi:cation and Some Objections to it 
The ·justification presented by Lewis for his system of ethical 
principles is primarily 'concerned with the, cognitivy nature of the prin-
ciples. The question which must first. be answered is, what is (are) the 
source (s) of our knowledge of the ethical principles? After. this question 
· .. is answered, the means of attaining knowledge of the ethical pr~nciples 
will be compared with Lewis' general theory of knowledge. This com-
parison will make possible the determination, using the criterion of 
consistency, of whether Lewis' system-is cognitive. If.the.ethical prin-
ciples are knowable in a-manner which is consistent with the cognitive 
processes and justifying procedures outlined by L~wis, the system of 
ethical pri:r:1ciples will be justified. The justification itself, however, 
is, the primary point in question.· The first.part of. this chapter, then, 
consists o.f an exposition of Lewis' justification and .an outline of two 
objecti0ns to it. 
. . 
Lew~s' ,justificatio'n. Throv.ghout his writings \concerning moral 
problems, Lewis insists upon the claim that his system of moral principles 
is cog~itive .. So, t.he principles 0f right acting (the moral principles) 
are .meaningfully .. apprehended. Justification,; of Lewi13' claim that moral 
principles are cognitive therefore .entails showing that the moral 
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principles are apprehended in a manner described in his epistemology as 
1 
meaningful. 
Since it is the system of moral princiPles which is held to be cog-· 
nitive,·the grounds of the system must be distinguished from the·system 
itself. It.is from these grounds that the moral principles are derived. 
Included in the grounds of Lewis' system of moral principles are acknow-
ledgments, human nature and imperatives. The most fundamental of the 
2 
acknowledgments·is of objective reality. Human nature, however,·demands 
the acknowledgment of imperatives; 3 and, the fact of the necessarily 
social.nature of hum.an life must alsobe takehas a fundamental datum for 
4 
any system of ethics. 
Throughout his writings on ethics, Lewis also insists upon the 
~ priori nature of the moral principles. Therefore, the apprehension of 
the moral principles is analytically verifiable, and the grounds of the 
system of moral principles are "given" in the apprehension of the moral 
. . 1 5 pr1nc1p es. The task at hand, then, is to show how the grounds of the 
system of moral principles are combined in a manner which makes possible 
the analytic apprehension of .the moral principles. 
The elements.of the grounds of the moral principles are not acknow-
ledged one prior to another in a temporally ordered sequence leading to 
the acknowledgment of the basic moral imperative. The basic moral 
1cf. supra., PP· 9-16. 
2 Cf. supra., p. 7. 
3cf. supra., p. 50. 
4 
Cf. G.N.R., p. 90. 
5Even.in the case of meaningful analytic apprehensions, there is a 
given element. Cf. supra., .p. 16. 
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. 6 . imperative is acknowledged as such.· The fundamental data, while they 
are indeed acknowledged, are yet distinguishable.onlybyabstra:ction 
from the concept of the basic moral imperative. What is thus acknow-
ledged is not mer.ely one or another of the grounds of the moral system, 
but the totality of these grounds, and this acknowledgment results in an 
awareness of the sense meanings whose structuredrelations fix the defi-
" . 117 nition of· morally right. · It is this structure of the definitive sense 
meanings of "morally rightll-...,the concept of the morally right--from which 
8 . 
the moral principles are derived.in a cognitive manner, What is acknow-
ledged is the basic moral imperative, but it is the concept of the basic 
" . " moral imperative which is the given element in the apprehension of the 
moral principles. It is the concept of the basic moral imperative which 
is definitive of the morally right, While the basic moral imperative· is 
not known, since conceptualization is an analytic process the results of 
·which are analytically verifiable, the concept of the basic moral impera-
tive is known a priori and is an .2, priori truth.9 
Lewis holds the fundamental law of ethics to be the basic moral 
imperative. As a fundamental law, the basic moral imperative is as-
. . 10 
serted to be£_ priori. The moral principles derived from the basic 
moral imperative are explicitly analytic statements about the basic 
6cf. supra., p. 50. 
7cf. supra., p. 19f, 
8cf. supra., p. 13. 
9cf. supra., PP• 19, 20. 
10 Cf. supra., p. 5lf, 
moral imper:ative/l and the analytic truth of the moral principles. is 
. determined by, showing that they are .consistent with the conC!ept of the. 
basic moral, imperative. 
The moral principles are the rules concerning right acting which 
are a necessary-factor. in the determination of the.morally right, but a 
moral judgment--is also_ required, l 2 The required .. inoral_·judgment must- be 
' ' 
cognitive because it is one of t}J.e two factors involved in the systematic 
det.er.m:i,nation of. the morally right.• Since the judgment must be cogni-
tive, it is either analytically verifiable or empirically verif{able.13 · 
' " 
:Mor.al judgments, however, are a -type of value judgment and, as such, are 
empirically, ne.t analytically, verifiabie. l 4 ··· Since an empirically veri-
' ' ' 
-fiable. judgment. is required· in th_e systematic determination of the moral-
ly·right, the analytic verification of the truth.claims of the moral 
principleS .. iS. insuf'ficierit to justify Lewi.$ I C:laiJD. ,that hiS. ethical 
system,is cognitive. Not dnly must the meaning r~lations of the moral 
principles.be analytically verified, the significance of the analyti<! 
. - . . 
' ', '.,· .· .. ' .. ' _·· ' l5 
kn.owledge oi' the moral principles must also be_ taken into account. 
The moral principles function asa guide for·riumanacts. The.prin-
ciples 0f_right acting are brought by.t:P,e mind to the cognitive moral 
evaluative j~dgment, l:>ut the judgmerit involved.in the.cognition-of the 
principles of right.acting is·nota moral evaluative judgment since it 
_llcf. supra., p. 18f. 
12cf. 
-supra.·, p. 47. 
l3Cf. supra., pp. l5f:,· 25ff, 29. -
. l4Cf .• supra., p. 35f. 
l 5cf.-supra., p. lO. The signification of the moral principles 
includes· their applicability to concrete ·situations. 
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is. analytically .verifiable. The asserti0n of. the truth of the meaning' 
relations e:xpressedby·the moral principles is analytically verifiable, 
but the assertion i;hat the.moral principles are relevant to human.acts 
·requires empirical justification of· its truth claim, 
Thus., there is another consideration which. is ·~elevant .. to the dis-
.cussion of .our .. Jmowledge of the, mqral principles· .. Ill addition to being 
. . . . . .· . . . ' . , . · ... ' . ·. ·._ .. .· 
. consistent with ,the basic moral imperative, . a cognitive ·ethical System· 
. ,, . . .. '. . : ·.. · ..... · . . . 
must be II, , , Characterized by,1that integrity which swnmons all pertinent 
· evidence and giv~s. all items their d.ue weight in conclusions .d.r.awn, 1116 
. . . . : . . 
. ·. . . . 
The mo:ral principles :provide .!! priori criteria for making judgments: con-
.· .· . .· .. 
' cerning which of tb,e possible alternative w~ys of acting in a given 
situation ·is. that .way which. is morally right, . "Morally•right'i is proper-
ly predicated only of actsaiid the doers. of acts .. Since.an act is 
, . : ·-. 
morally-right in so far as. lt re.l3ults in c9mparative good;17the doer of 
the act,is :moral, in so far as his acts result in the realization of com-
•parative good, So, another criterion is suggestedforthe justification 
of the cognitive claims of the moral principles: comparative good . 
. To this point, the following assertions have been. made: l) the 
. .. . . 
· basic moral imperative is definitive. of ·''morally· right;" 2). "morally 
right" is applicable only to acts and to ·the doers of. acts; .. and 3) . a 
morally right .. act. is one the results of which .possess :comparative good, 
From·these assertions, it fol],.ows that :them.oral principles must provide 
., .' : . . ... · .· . . 
. . . : . •. ·. . 
. . . . 
. . ~ 
·17cf · · · 34 "c ·t· d·" f. t·. t.h · · d 
, supra., p. . , ompara· i ve goo re ers : o , e goo ·. ex-
pected to be reaiized, in the ,conseg_uences of the contemplated .. alternatives 
where one .alternative pattern.of acting.is selected as having more 
·potential .for good. than have: the . other. alternatives .. 
. . . . . ., 
. . : ·.. . . . .. . . 
those guides to acting which, when the acts areperforni.ed incognitive 
. accordance with, the. principles, consistently result in:,t~e',realization 
. ~. . . . . . ,• : . 
of comparative good. Since goodness is an.object:i.ve•pr~pel'ty Of objects 
. . 
.. and events, there .is .. an empirical element as well .. as ~n analytical element. 
, involved in.the justification of Lewis' system of'imoral pi·inciples~18 .·· 
. . . . . . . . . . . 
Theempirical E!lem~nt which m~st,.be ta.ken into:ac~otmt in the, justification 
.of any .tnoral principle. consists of. the consequences of acts~ ... · That part 
of the ·consequence.of the act which.is a determinantof:the·moral·right-
ness · of ari .. act .. is the property of ~oodness / 9 .· 
The decision to ·perform any.:particular act is, in.part a judgment of. 
the. potential for good of each of: the contemplated alternatives; That 
a.ct.which is selected is selected.because··it·.is judged .. to possess. more 
potential for good .. than the other alternatives. The judgment that to 
act in one .part.icular manner will result in in.ore good than will another 
. .. . . 
pattern of acting calls for justification.of.its claim.of correctness.· 
. . 
In other words does the chos.en act, ,wli~n carried out, result in compara-
tive good? 
The problem.at this.point .is one ef reconciling the]. priori nature 
of the ,moral principles with the pragmatic element of their justification.· 
The reconciliation is made through the use of ·Lewis' e0ncept of,the 
· "p:ragmaticall~r·Ja priori.'·' By taking the moral principles ::as .. ·. 
18 . · .· 
· Cf. supra., .pp .. 40ff, 46. 
. . . 
l9since it ,is. the result of an act which ,is ,in queition, and since 
.. a:h.,act entails the bringing about of something 0bjective; tlie, applicat1on 
of. the. ·criterion of comparative good gives ari empirical justifica.tioii. · 
because goodnes,s. is an objective, empirically, kn0wn .property• oCari. object 
. or event, .· Since goodness . and·· l:>adne,ss •are. objective properties,. there· is 
no such thing as moral go0dness or. mora~ badne.ss ~.. Goodness cari, , and• does, 
h0wever, se:rve .as a criterion 0f the morally right. .Cf. supra.;., pp. 32f, 39. . . . . 
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pr.agmatically,J!_. priori principles, Lewis has. suggested .that although the 
mor,al principles have an.!! priori and an,imperative character, they,.are:, 
nevertheless, subject to.alteration or abandonment in the face of new 
.. .. ' 
and changing empirical situations .. Iri other words, if th~ categories 
_are not applicable with any degree of consistency,· they may. be. abandoned 
•. . . . . : ·. 
in -favor of new or modified generalizations which ._are :inore consistently 
, applicable. This is not. meant to .. imply that. the .. · basic moral imperative, 
which is acknowledged as such, .is-altered or abandoned. Instead, alter-
native formulations of it inay,be deduced, or the formulatipns in use may 
simply.be altered, Thus, the.2, priori nature of.the moral principles.is 
maintained eventhough the usefulness of formulations of.the moral prin-
ciples is determined empirically. As an analytic principle, a mor1:1l prin-
ciple is true independent of any·nE:w.or changing situation. But, as.a 
rule of right acting, . its usefulness,. ·in _that .capacity ·,is justified by 
.·the consequences of acts which have been committed J.n .accorclarice with ,the 
principle, The~analytically derived principle of the morallyright.;i.s 
' . . ·, 
known,!! priori; but, the principle, as a :principle of right act;L;qg:'wnfoh 
. . . · .. : .· . 
_is applicable .in concrete situations, . is empirically justified as useful 
or not. And,.since knowledge is for the sake,qf actiori, the correctness 
of our moral evaluative cognitions. is determined by the consequences of 
our acts; i.e., the correctness of our _moral evalua:tive judgments is 
determined empirically. So, as rules of right acting, moral princip_les 
. demand empirical justification. as well._ as analytical. verification: they 
are pragmatically,!! priori principles. 
In summary, .the principles of right acting are,analytically:derived 
from the basic moral imperative. The basic moral imperative is simply 
.. . . 
,acknowledged; but,. if this acknowledgment is questioned, the elements of 
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·the basic moral imperati~e · can be abstracted from :the con,cept of the 
: . . . 
basic moral imperative. When these elements: are considered,·, the acknow .. 
. ledgment· of the basic moral imperative is shdwn .to be ·nece~sa:ry, · and the 
.necessity of. the acknowledgment result.s from human nat'Lµ'e ,itself_;..,.froni . 
the demand for principles of correct decision. The moral:p:rinciples 
are known.insofar as they;are,anal.ytically·verified apprehens.ions:of the 
meaning r.e1.ations ef the -basic moral imperative. Thus,, the judgments ·of 
' ' 
the.meaning relatiens.imp{icitly contained in-the ba8-ic moral imperative 
. . ._: . .. .. .· . 
,are cognitive judgments which,result-in.krlowledgeof t:hemoralpri!lciples; 
The mor~l principles, as principles of right .acting, must· lead to 
' ' ' 
, acts the consequences of which :possess comparative good. • Therefore, in 
addition to analytical verification:, the moral principles require em-
pirical justifi:cation. The .. analytical verification, and the empiri6al 
. ·. . . justification-of moral-principles.are the,same as.for analytic appre-
. . . . 
. ' . . . . : . .. . . . .·· . . 
hensions.ingeneral and for empirical evaluative cognitions, respectively, 
'... . .,· . . 
The combination of the .analytic and empirical elements.:by,means •of.:his. 
concept of the pragmaticallY,.!!i priori .enables Lewis to assert .. that the 
' . 
principles:of right .acting are analytically:true; but, since the prin-
·C!iples.are guides for deciding .upon a particular course of action which 
is expected to resl.l.lt in comparative good, practical justification, is · 
called for in order to ascertain -whether, in fact, acts performed. 
according to the -moral principles do result in comparative g0od, 
Thus, in accorq.ance. with Lewis' epistemology, . there a:re , two .· con-
' . : ... 
. stituents ·involved.in-the determination ofthe:moral.rightnessofany 
. act: 1) · the ~ priori. moral principle ·which is the rule , ~6n~erning right 
.acting;. and 2) the (empirically justifiable) judgment of the good which 
~ . ,: . . . . .. . . . . : . . . 
• is expected to- 0be realized iri ·the· consequences . of', the.p8rticular act or · 
. . ' 
acts decided. upon. 20 The system of ethical principles:is_meaningfully 
. appr.eherided and. analytically verifiable' and the judgments of expected 
good .and of the correct .. pattern of acting to f-ollow in··a given ·situation 
. 2l 
are pract.icallyiand morally.·justif.iable. 
' . . . . . . . 
Our_knowledge of this system 
as a system of.principles of- right actitig-is praginatically_!apriori_k~ow ... 
-ledge, and this k.now],.edge is attainable· in a manner which.,is consistent 
with;Lewia' epistemological findings. 
10b;iections to .Lewis' .justification, There are,. to •be sure, 
difficulties to be found in Lewi$ I proposed justification of the. cogni-
tive claims of:his ethical system; There is the objection. to. his teleo-
,logical approach in general as well as some more specific objections. 
There ·-is. objection,·· such as ·that raised. by William ,K. ·. Frankena, . to. his 
treatment·of the . .!a priori _and analytic regarding the ethical principles, 
And, . there · is also the objection, such, as that of ijans ·Reichenbach, . which 
, calls ·into ·question the necessity.·of. the analytic truth of. the moral, im-. 
. . 
. . 
perative. These. objections, .beginning with·the 0ne typified. by Frankena, 
will now be presented. Suggested answers·to,thei:fe bbjections will be 
presented. in -the .. succeeding section. of the present. chapter; 
_· In his review .of Lewis' The :Ground .and Nature of th~- Right, Frankena 
_raises the·question whether the:basic imperatives of right22 are re-
garded by Lewis .as:~ priori arid. analytic,· or as .!a posteriori and. 
20cf. supra·,., p. 47. 
2lcf. supra., p. 38. 
22Here, Frankena . is • _concerned with the various · statements · of the 
basic moral imperative such.as the Law.of Moral Equality:and the·Law of 
Compassion. 
· 23 
empirical. According to Franken.a, these are the only, alternatbr~s open 
to Lewis . en 'the bas.is . of ·his insistence upon the coinciden~e 0f: the>./:! . 
priori and. the analytic. If 'Lewis I. justiffoatiQn ~s to he successful in 
showing. that the system of ethical principles . is cognitive, so <the argu- . 
. . . I . . .· ·. ·. . ·. . · .. ·.. .. 
ment .goes, .it must ascertain wliether ·alLof the principles of right 
{including the basic moral imperative) are analytic. :i:n. other ·words, 
. . 
. Lewis must .clarify: his·• treatment of. the .. analytic charaeter · of the basic 
moral,imperatives. Fra:rlkenastates .this objection to:Lewis' justifi-'. 
cation.in·the ebservation that Lewis 
" . regards what is usually called naturalism. {the .view .·· 
·tiiat ethical and value .. judgments al'.e. a'species .of empiricai 
. knowledge) ·as.false for at. least the ·basic 'imperative of 
right, 1 though true for.· judgments of good and bad .. But . 
·there .is.no4indication t;hat he regards such,imperati'ves as 
analytic. "2 . . . · 
. ·. . :. . ·.· .. : .· 
·· The . accusation : here . is . that Lewis. wavers between ,holding the basic moral 
imperative·te be the result of an analytically verified apprehension and 
holding tqe basic moral.imperative. to be acknowledged.because of the 
demands of·human nature. 
The po.sition,is taken by Frank.ena that.Lewis.cannot offer other than 
.an.analytic verification.for the basic moral imperatives·and that Lewis' 
: . . . . ·. . . . : .. 
. . . . 
principles of right acting·are some·sort of expression of·a fundamental, 
universaLhuman need; , So,. acc~rding to Frankena~ ."It is, ~t any•rate, 
not. clear ·that. Lewis' thinks ~f rightness as a prep~rty: of _actions,. as 
cognitivists do; Much of the. time he eq_uates being right a~d being 
23cf .. Frahkena, W •.. K,, "Review of Lewis i :,~ Ground and Nature of 
·.~ Righ.t." Philosophical Review, {LXVI;, 1957), .pp.· 398-402. · 
24Ibid.,, P• 399. 
I • t • f O d I " 25 Th• t f ,._ • t • 0 t t • , Jus. i ie. , . 1.s . ype o o'-'Jec 1.0.n raises wo ques J.ons: .. 1). Does 
. Lewis h0ld that the basic moral imperative is ~ priori in the sense· of 
. . 
.being .. analytically .. apprehended? , and . 2) If the P!agmati~aliy,J! priori 
' . ' . . 
. . . ' . . . 
is not coincident with the analytic, can his ethical system be. justified 
as ·consistent .and .cognitive according.te his epistemology? 
•. . . :·_ . .; .· _.· 
Objections of tri.e type raised by Hans Reichenb~ch are primarily 
. objections . te basing any cognitive system .of ethics ,upon ,principles 
' . . . 
·which are claimed .te possess analytic certai;nty .. ·. The cla~ni is made,. in 
the·course ·of such objection.s that ~_priori principles are not applicable 
. .··, ... . ... 
to empirical matters of fact.if the.y,are. to retain.their·anaiytic charac-
ter. This·leads to.the conclusion,that any-system of principles which 
is cognitive and which:has practical.application must begin.in experience 
and be yaliq.ated through expe,rience .26 According. to- ·this .poirt of view, 
any princi:ple which is definitive of something which, in turn:, calls. for 
empiric.al .justification,.·· is a · synthetic pri~ciple. 27 ··· 
. . ' . . . . 
Thus, if tewis insists upon the ~.priori nature of the-basic moral· 
_imperative,.the imperative would have·to.be synthetic as well as:~ 
priori; Lewis, of course, --~ften. and explicitly denies :this to ·be the 
. . . . 
.. 25F nk. ·. w· K. 11L · ' Twrn t · f R" 'ht' "·. Ph" · 1 · h"' ·1 ra . ena, . . , . ewis ..... ':Pera 1.ve o ·.... 1.g . • · .. •· 1 osop 1.ca 
. Studies, . (XIV; 1963), p. :27~ 
26. .. . .· ' 11 . · . · . 
· Cf .. Reichenbach_, Hans. Are Phenomenal· Reports Abs,olutely 
Certain?"·. Philosophical._Review, · (LXI; .1952), p .. 148. 
. . . 
27A synthetic principle results from a synthetic judgment. A 
synthetic judgment asserts something which is not present either 
. implicitly or explicitly; iri. ,the grounds upon which ·the- judgment is 
m.ade. Such ,a. judgment -relates. two concepts""-,.a subject C!oricept with·· a 
P,redicate concept. The predicate concept iSnot inclucled within:the 
subject.proper. -Cf. "Synthetic-Judgment" inDic-tionary_of_Philosophy 
ed, by Runes, D.~ (Littlefield, Adams and-Co,; .1959) ,·P~ 310, · 
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case, Again,.Lewis' concept of the pragmatically la, prforiiscalled 
. into question. The argument here is that Lewis usea the concept of. the 
pragmatically,2, priori to provide a framework of certainty for moral 
evaluative judgments. But,· since principles which are applic::able to 
concrete situations are themselves generalizations from experience, such 
principles are actually,!a_ posteriori, synthetic, and.require empirical 
justification.· 
However, if Lewis. still insists upon the pragmatically 2, priori 
nature of the basic moral imperative, the objection is that this.claim 
amounts to nothing else than a claim that the imperative.is, after all, 
a synthetic 2, priori.Principle, This objection leaves only.the follow-
ing alternatives .open to Lewis: · 1) If the system is·. indeed· cognitive, 
·. the basic moral imperative must be recognized for what it is--a general-
. ization based upon empirical data and which calls . for empirical justi-
fication and not analytic verification only; or 2) Since Lewis denies 
the claim of any principle to be synthetically 2, priori, 29 if the 2,. 
priori nature of the h.asic moral imperative is insisted upon, that im-
perative cannot be applied as a guide to moral.judgments (which are a 
type of empirical.judgment) in any manner which could.be classified as 
cognitive. This first alternative would require an.alteration.of Lewis' 
justification, particularly,inregard to his treatment.of the basic moral 
imperative as pragmatically,2, priori; and, the second alternative would 
be tantamount to rejecting the cognitive claim of the system of ethical 
principles of rightacting altogether. 
28 Cf, A,K,V,, PP· 151-168, and M,w.o., PP· 25f, 214-229, 433-436. 
29cf. 17:r· supra., p. · . 
Both types of' obJection menticmed above are. implicitly directed at 
the tel.e.ologic.al orientation pf' Lewis'. ethical system1 The question -is 
how Lewis .can maintain his claim -of the i priori truth of the moralprin.;. 
ciples .and, at the E1ame time,hold that the moral.principles.are justi~ 
. : .. . ' 
fied ·. empirically? .In both . types of objection, the .. · implicat:ion. is . that 
. . . . ·. 
' ' 
Lewis should abandon his claims of the Jayriori 11ature of the moral prin-
ciples and .that he· should recognize his teleological position .anci. the 
' ' 
resulting empirical nature of the moral.prin~iples. In ot,he:i;- :words, 
. ' . .. . . . : : . 
since Lewis:holds>the principles of right actirig.tobe justifiableem-
pirically,in terms of cons~quences of a9ts, he miist admit that the prin-
ciples themselves must be the result of empirically:jus~ifiable judgments-
and, therefore, empirically known only. 
However, Lewis does. admit the neces.sity for .empirical justification 
. . . ·. 
both of' the .moral principles )nd all moral judgments. ,,In spit~ of this 
admission,.he, holds that .5!. priori moral principles: are.also necessary 
for any.cognitive system of ethical principles: 30 .· The .5!. priori truth of 
.the moral. principles is not. incompatible with the alterability of ;the 
principles .31 ·The. compatability of. pragmatic elements w,:ith,.5!, priori 
elements. ·is necessary for Lewis' ethical system; but, . an .5!. priori 
.element, is necessarily.present in any· empiricaJ:.J.y· verifiable appre:.,. 
hens ion, 32 so the compatability of pragmatic and .5!. -priori e;t.e:ments alone 
.does not justify,·his ciaim.that _his ethical.system results trom .a combi-
. . .. ·-:. .. . 
. . .. · .. 
nation of ethical rational.is~ and ethical naturalism. Nor does that 
JOCf' .• supra.' p. 47. 
31 52. Cf. supra., P• 
· 32 
Cf. .supra., PP• 15, 29f, 
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com.pat.ability, in and of itself, justify·the claim "t;hat,.as . §_priori· 
.principles of right acting, the moral principles are,cognitive. ·Lewis 
.cannot admit to a purely teleological system. of ethics; because such. an 
admission would negate his claim that his. system results from.,a combi-
. nation of ethical rationalism and ethical natura:lis:in, ·· But, .. the· ethical 
system:is not shown.to be a cognitive system resulting from that combi-
nation by merely showing the compatability of.§. priori with pragmatic 
.elements. within the system. 
A Suggested.Emendation of.Lewis' Justification 
In so far as ·Lewis' justification. is . intended to show-·that the 
moral principles are .§_priori.and cognitive, according to his episte-
. ' . 
mology, any.mistake would be·in the:form of an inconsistency. An.incon-
sistencyiin the justification might very well be the result of. an equivo-
cation which would be found in discussing the nature of the basic moral 
· imperative and the moral principles. Thus; the point ·of the objections 
. is .that in his treatment of the basic moral imperative, the moral prin-
ciples, and the pragmatically~.§. priori, Lewis is either· unclear or.·incon-
sistent, or both.. The first task, then, is to clarify Lewis' . conception 
of the pragmatically.§. priori as it applies .to the moral principles and 
to the basic moral imperative. In the course of this clarification, the 
suggested emendation of Lewis' justification wiJ,.lbe formulated, 
Although the,.§. prfori and .the analytic coincide, Lewis has used 
. . 
.'~ priori" in three distinct ways while he has made only. two distinct 
us.es of "analytic. 11 A statement is .§. priori if'. it is true by definition. 
It is this sense of .!a priori which is used in referring .to·linguistic 
. . · .. · 
meaning relations. · II . • II There· is also the corresponding use of· analytic, . · 
.. . . ... ·.. ':· ·.· ... · .. ··. ·. . . , ... · .. -'-
and .her,e, at .. least., the analytic and ~ p~i0ri coincide. There. is. also 
anether·sense in which•the . .! priori and the analytic correspond: .it is. 
the sense in which ,a statement is ~aicl ~0 be .! priori or ~;nalytic as ;it 
. •.· •. l •. 
is definit.i:ve of something~ ·. In ,thts case, .'~ priori';· and llana1ytic" 
. . . . . 
refer to . the relations of s~nse :meanings ~nd: are :doincident •.. While S 
.· . . 
. . 
. this exhaust.s the .types of the ,arialytic, there .is yet .one .moi,e. type of 
. . .· . .. . ·. · .... · ........ ·· ... ·· ·.: .. :.··:.· · .. ·· ... -. ·.·.:· . · .. . 
_,! priori: the ·pragmati6ally,_! priori. Thus, .the <aUestion here has 
become one of whetl:ler and,. if so, in what mann1=r, the. pragmaticaµ.1 · 
.! priori coincides with the analytic. 
Since the conc.ept of i:;he basic moral imperative i.s -definitive of 
. . 
th 11 • ht 33 t t ' t.. h • h t • th h .· . II 11 • ht II 
·.. e ·mar.a y ·rig· ,. . s a emen s ·w 1c con ain- e p rase,. mora y_·rig , 
are not, statements of the concept of the bas.ic moral, imperative per ~· 
Such statements.utilize the phrase.which the concept of. the basic moral 
imperative is purported to defirie. 34 These derivative•state~ents are 
.! .priori: and analytic in, the .sense of ·being true by. definiticm .• · The con-
cept of the l:>asic moral in;iper:ative is not analytic in. the sense of ·being · 
true by.definition; so, if it is analytic, it must be analytic·in the 
sense of being definitive of the morally·right. WJ;J.ether·this purported 
analytic nature 0f.the concept. of .~he basic moral:imperati:ve coincides 
33 .· .. · ·. ·· ... 
· The basic mqral inlperative;. is riot known -s.ince it ... is. not. a veri-
fied. (or jus.tifie.d): cognition; It.· i~ not apprehended in such a way ·that 
it -can he either empirically or analyticaliy verifieci. - It is, the concept. 
of the basic mor:al imperative which>is known._! ,priori, and iLis.from 
. this concept '.\;hat the principles o:f rigl:l:t ·acting are der:i:v'ed~ Thus, it. 
, is· not the. basic moral imperative ,its~lf whicll, is defiriitive .. of the mor~ 
ally ·right, .but. it' is the concept -of the basic moral,.imperative wllich 
is definitive E>f the morally right. . . ' > ' ' .· 
34 ·. .· .... ·.... ,. .·. . .· . . · .. ·• ·. · .... 
An e~ample of such a deriyative statement., is.,the following: 
" . .a way of acting, to be right in a given ,case, must be one ·whfch 
woUld; . in the same premisses .of a.ction, .be right. in every., ii:istance and 
right of any1>ody .. " · Lewis, o:ur S.ocialinheritance, p. 93. · - · .. ·· 
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with the pragmatically~,pri0ri in the manner descr:i,.bed in.Lewis' episte-
.· ·· .. 
mology stands: ,in need C>f further consideration. 
' ' ' 
In order to discern ,the. manner., in which ,,the ·pragmat;tc.allY:~ ,pr.iori 
,coincides with the analytic nature of the moral principles, stateII1ents 
of the concept .of. the basi.c moral i:tnperative must be distinguish~d from 
. : . . .. · ·.. .. . 
the statements ,of the de~tyative ~;ral principles, ,· The/concept ·0f the. 
basic. moral imperative is expressed in the imperative,for~;\.e., 'it. is 
. , ·: . , . , , , II·. • . . 11 · 
The terms, . r1.ght or · of the form, . "Act .in ~uch and silch a manner.'·'· 
. . . . . - .. · 
·"just,!' are not contained in a statement of.the ,~encept of the,basic 
moralimpe;rative itself, ,It is·the ,concept.of. the basic moral ini:pera-
t • b t h • h .h t t t . t • . th· t· II • ht 11 II• t II 
- 1.ve a· ou . w 1.c sue s a emen. s as con a1.n e. erI)ls, r1.g or Jus , 
are niade. .Since the concept of the basic moral imperative provides the 
d f • • t· • f . II 11 • ht 11 • d • th l" d t • . f l . • d e 1.n1. 1.on .. o · mora y rig · require 1.n. . e va 1._ a 1..on o mora · JU g-
ments, ·it.cannot be validated in the same manner as are derivative prin-:-
ciples of. right or as are moral judgments. The .conc.ept of the. basic 
moral imperative is, however, .!a priorLin. another.·manner. ·. It is ~ priori 
as Frank.ena has observed. in that it. has an .. assured status because 
II 
.. the repudiation of. it is self-contravening ·in a particularly crucial 
. ' . . 
pragmatic, though not strictlytlogical,. way. 1135 -•In this. sense, the prag-
matically:,~ priori nature of the concept of. the basic moral imperative 
renders poss.ibl,e. the combination of the :la. priori and empirical types of 
,·knowledge; but, this :interpretation of the pragmat:l.~alJ.y.~ priori is ·not 
the same as.·was ·presented .in Lewis I justification. of the co~n:Ltive -nature 
of his system 0f ethicai principles. · 
' . . 
·Lewis' proposed ,.justification :bases. the. claim 'f0r the !! priori 
35Frank.ena,. IILewifl' Imperatives of Right, 11 op cit., p. · 27. · 
. . 
n~ture of the concept of the basic moral imperative upon its being defini-
-tive of the morally right, The interpretation given:in the -preceding 
paragraph suggests that the ,!!,priori nature of the concept of the-1:>asic 
_moral. imperative· does not rest upon ,its being. definitive of m0ral right-
. . . . . 
ness, but rests upon the fact of man 1 s ration~l nature,· -If.the pragmati-
. call.y .!! priori is interpreted in this latte_r manner, it : has been taken 
.. in a sense. different .t;han that which.appears i:ihr~µ:g-:tiattt:r,Lewis '.,ipistemo;. 
-.. . ·. ,. :· .. ·· .. 
logical considerations .. In An.Analysis of Knowledge>and Valuation, Lewis 
. . . . . 
. : . . . 
often emphasizes the coincide.nee of the .!! priori: with the _analytic in r 
. such. a .manner as . to disclaim any dependence of .. ~ priori or analytic prin--
. ' 36 
ciples, upon empirical matters of fact. · InMind and the World _Order, 
he makes the following·assertion: "That is.!! priori.which we can main-
tain.in the face of all experience, no matter what."37 However,-the 
analytic ri.ature ef the basic mo:ral impera-tive is no longer so urgently 
. insisted upon. :tn Our Social _Inheritance,. it is maintained that the con-
cept of the. basic moral imperative.is not independent of experience 
because it is impossible t·o have a basic categorical ethical principle 
which is" .. ,independent of any·kind of empirical facts, and yet 
·. . I . . .· 
determine[ s] in every_ instance,. whether the act in question -is .. right or 
,.38 
wrong. 
. ; .· . ·. 
In his inststence upon a cognitive ethical system,.Lewis has re-
mained aware of the rieed to take into account both the cognitive and 
. reflective characters of. hu:rnan nature. '.:Thus, in addition to conformity 
36 ' 
. Cf,; A.K.V., pp. 35,..38, 72-77, 157-168. 
37 . M.w.o., ·.P· 224. 
38Lewis, Qllll :Social ,Inheritance, p. 97 ... 
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.to the logical requirement of consistency, a cogfiitive eth;cal system· 
must :be " ... ·. cl:").aracterized by that integrity which summons all p~rti-' 
.· .. 
nent evidence and gives all items their due weight.in conclusions 
•,: 
drawn. 1139 In addition to the :ratienal nature. of nian, there is_ also the· 
:fact of the necessarily social nat\ll'e of human life '.Which-must.be in-
-eluded in the determination .of what. is right to- bring about. 40 · The 
fact of the social nature of human ·life .is .an empirical fact which is 
acknowledged in :the ~ame, way asi J.S the existence ·Of' objective .reality • 
. ·.· ·, . _· .. ·. . ·_,. .. ' . 
Since the ground of the concept.of the. basic moral _imperative includes. 
all pertinent evidence, the- ,acknowledgme,nt of ext~rnal reality. and of. 
the social nature · 0f. tiuman. life must ,.therefore be : considered t0 be in-
eluded in that ground .. Inasmuch-as these acknowledgments are of em-
.. . . . : . : . :. ··. 
pirical facts,-. it follows that t:ti.e;e • is ;n empiricai ~iement -to be 
' ' 
found.in-the apprehension of tne concept of the basic moral, imperative • 
.. . · . . ·. . .· 
While Lewis'helds that the basic moral imperaiive i~a specific 
instance of.the r:ational imperative and therefore,the aria.lyi;i:c element 
of the conc~pt of the basic meral imperative must ::be cons.istent with 
' ' 
the concept .of the rational impe.:rative, · this consistencyds primarily 
.•. of. ·linguistic meaning relations because the··· sense meaning :relations con-
tained in :the ·concept of the basic moral imperative are n~t' found in 
the concept of, the :rati~rial iir1perative .alone; Those s€nse meaning .· 
relatior1s present .. in the, concept of 'the basic moral-imperative, but not 
: . . . . ·• ... . . . '. ' . 
,' in the conce1>t 'of the rational imperative' account for th~ uniqueness 
of the -concept of the basic morali:mpera:tive .. These-meaning ;elations 
39 · · · 
G, N, R, , p, . 79, 
4o 
· Cf. supra. , p. 48 •.. 
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are not, however, counter to those which are. centained iri the concept of 
. . 
. .· .. : .·.• . . 
the rational imperative. (There . is no 'impl:i,.cation of any synthetic .! 
. priori aspect of the moral tinperativ-e i~tended here.) .· The·. sense meaning 
relations found:.in the concept of the basic moral.imperative, but not.in 
the concept of the rational imperative, are thus ultimately.derived from 
. the acknowledgment . of empirical facts. 
.. .. ·.·_ -: . .· . . i·· 
. . . 
There are, then, two elements involved in the cognition of the con-
cept of the basic imperative .• of right acting:.·· an empirical ~le:ment as 
well as an :analytic element. Since .we are cognitively,awaI'e of the con-·. 
·Cept .of the basic moral imperative,·the apprehension 0f·it must be a· 
type of mean.ingful.apprehension;.and,.as·this.acknowledgmentcontains 
. . . ·. . . . . -: . . . 
empirical .as well as analytic elements it must be im empirically veri-
fiable apprehensien~ · Due ·to the empirical eleni.ent .present in the cog"'.' 
nition .. of ·the conc.ept of the pasic moral imperative, the imp.erative, .· as 
the· basic principle· of right acting, .. is, ultimately,· empirically justi-
. fiable orily. 
However,.the .§.priori character of the concept of.the b,asic moral 
imperative precludes any·experierttially determined.alteration of it, 
Therefore, it must he .the:principles.of right.acting, which.are derived 
from,the basic moral imperative, ·that are subject to alteration or,aban-
donment .in the face of new:arid changing empirical sit11ations, . These 
. .· . 
derivative principles, if they are consistently derived;·. are analyti-
cal!~( true by' definition:; but, as applicable principles of right acting, 
. . ·. . - . . . 
. . . - '· . . 
they must be yalidated not .orily .. as.a rationally warranted>belief:, but 
also as empirlcally justified (both practically' imd:merally). Although 
. . . . . 
. . . . . .. . . 
the statementswhich,are:consistently derived from the concept of the 
basic moral imperative are analytically.··true, they,tepref3erit nothing 
m0re than.a particular·interpretation.of the basic imperative, which 
. interpretation .. is . influenced by empirically apprehended data. Thus, 
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in the face of new.or changing empirical situations, the interpretation 
of the basic moral imperative which had been made at one time might not 
be applicable at another time. In such a case, the deriyative prin-
ciples of right.are subject to alteration. This.alteration (or abandon-
ment) is nothing more than a reinterpretation of the basic moral im-
perative which·itself remains unaltered. By wayof·illustration, let us 
suppose that at time t 0 , we find ourselves in situation S0 where there is 
a decision to be mad.e concerning whether to commit act A1 or A2 • So, we 
make judgments concerning the ·consequences of the alternative acts, 
.which judgments are empirically justifiable, The decision of which act 
to commit, .however, must, if the performed act is to be morally.right, 
adhere to a principle of right acting. Having acknowledged the basic 
moral imperative, an interpretation of the basic moral imperative is 
made in light of S0 and previous similar situations, The fornnilation of 
this interpretation.is the principle of right acting which ,is to be 
foll0wed in electing to perform:a particular act. If. it is decided to 
perform A1 and if that decision is made according to the derived prin-
ciple of right acting, i;hen, if A1 results in comparative good,.that 
derived principle is pragmatically justified as a principle of right 
acting. As the principle is applied to more and more situations, and 
acts undertaken .. in accorcl.ance with .it consistently result in comparative 
good, the justification of the principle is, of course, .strengthened, 
Suppose, however, that the situation Sn,.at some latertime tn,.presents 
·alternative patterns of acting, An and Am_, and, when the principle in 
question is applied to Sn and An :is performed in accordance with the 
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principle, the ,consequences do not possess comparative good. And, 
furthermore, in subsequent situations; acts performed according to·the 
principle do not consistently result in comparative good. It is.in such 
a case that the principle of right acting, although it is an analytically 
_ true stat.ement about the-concept of the basic moral imperative,. is•to-be 
altered or abandoned as an applicable principle of right acting, In 
other words, a reinterpretation of the basic moral imperative is to be 
made taking into account Sn and the subsequent situations. The main 
point to be made here is.that the "basic moral imperative remains unchanged 
and .!a priori in•the sense of being the ground of- the morally right. It 
__ is the practical application of the interpretation made in the face of 
present.and prior experiential facts which.is subject to practical and 
moral justification and, .therefore, subjects the intepretation,to alter.:.. 
t • b d t "f'th • t"f" t• f •t • II t• II .a 10n or.a-an onmen -1 -e JUS 1 ica ion o. 1 is .nega ive, 
The concept of the basic moral imperative is.thus .!a priori and 
analytic in the sense of being definitive of right, The alteration or 
a:t>andonment of derivative formulations of the basic moral imperative is 
not necessitated by the ·truth or falsity of the formulations themselves, 
but,. instead,. by. the applicability of a given formulation to a given 
objective situation. This consideration leads to the clarification of 
what Lewis intends in labelling the concept of the. basic moraLimpera-
tive a pragmatically .!a priori principle. The intention-is merely,that 
a basic principle is pragmaticallyja·priori if analytically.deduced 
.formulations of. it are subject to alteration or abandonment in the face 
of empirical situations to which the ·formulations.are purported to be 
applicable. While the p;ragmatically,J!priori does not-coincide with 
the analytic, a system -of pragmatically,_!! priori principles may·be at 
once consistent and cognitive according t~ Lewis' epistemology. 
Then,.the distincticm·between the basic moral imperative, which is 
simply·acknowledged.,.and the concept of the basic moral imperative, 
:which is._known ~ priori, is pointed out, it becomes evident that-.Lew:Ls' 
.ethical system is not -totally:teleological. An~ priori principle of 
right. acting must he cognitively adhered .to regardless of the actual 
consequences .0f. the act. It is the concept of the basic moral impera-
tive which ,is the non-teleological element in.Lewi~' ethical system. 
The. partially teleological character of this system.is the result of 
the combination of ethical rationalism_ ~and.· ethical naturalism. . The? 
moral judgments. are cognitive and require analyt.ic verification of the 
principle (s) of right acting upon which -they,are based as well as em-
.. pirical justification. The teleological and the non-teleological 
elements .. in Lewis' ethical system are mutually_ compatible in the same 
rnanner as are the pragrnatic and~ priori elements. 
The remaining que.stion concerns the necessity of any~ priori prin-
c.iple as .a basis of a system which is purported tobe applicable to em-
pirical situations. In other words, is Lewis' attempt. to combine ethical 
rationalism.and naturalism successful? It is suggested.that .according 
to. :t;he criteria provided by Lewis' epistemology,. the resulting system 
of prag:rnatically ,~ priori principles. of right .is justified as consis-
tent and cognitive. Thus, .Lewis can consistently acknowledge the im-
portance 0f the empirical element . in a system. of ethics which is 
demanded by Reichenbach, and, at the same time,. Lewis can maintain the 
,,s! priori validity of the concept of the basic moral imperative. So, 
Lewis is able to present his system of principles of right acting as.a 
system of pragmaticallY . .!a priori principles which,-in fact, are validated 
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· through experience. Since the principles of right are validated through 
exp.erience, they are not at once synthetic and .§. priori. . If they were 
. s.ynthetic _.§. priori principles, they would be verified .§. priori as · appli;;.. · 
·. cable to any possible empirical situation, and this would preclude the 
possibility of an experientially determined alteration. 
The reformulated justification which enables cogent answers to be 
given to.the stated objections consists primarily of a clarification of 
what Lewis intends by· "pragmatically .§. priori." The suggested emen-
dation of Le:wis' justification of. his system of principles of right as 
cognitive introduces .a distinction implied to some extent in~ Social 
Inheritance, but one which. Lewis did not utilize in his epistemological 
justification. The distinction in question is that drawn between the 
basic moral imperative, the concept of the basic moral imperative, and 
the principles of right derived from .it. The concept of the b.asic moral 
imperative is now seen to be analytically apprehended, The apprehension 
is of the .sense meaning.relations formulated from the sense meanings of 
the antecedent sense of rightness. The principles of right are derived 
from the concept of the basic moral imperative and are thus analytic. 
The derivative principles of right, then, are composed of linguistic 
meaning relations. And, the derivative principles o.f right, not the 
basic moral imperative nor the concept 6f the basic moral imperative, 
are purported to be applicable to empirical situations. That the de-
rivati:ve principles are·consistentlydeduced from the concept of the 
basic moral imperative is analytically verifiable. . Such. claim to 
applicability is the result of a non-terminating value judgment.and, 
as such, requires practical and moral justification. Thus, a syste:rn 
of pragmatically£_ priori principles, such.as Lewis' system of 
principles of right, is consistent with, and cognitive according to, 
Lewis' epistemology. The justification, as emended:, is ·. therefore 
suggested in order to clarify the manner in which Lewis' ethical system 
is cognitive according to his epistemological.assertions, 
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